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I. Introduction
The history of the United States traces a continuing struggle
between labor and management over control of the means of
production. Throughout the first centuries of the nation's
development, labor struggled for' and won certain basic rights for
American workers.2 Modem American labor policy was forged
out of this early struggle, and now comprises rights that Americans
have come to take for granted.3  However, this policy is
See, e.g., CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? 10-33 (1993) [hereinafter
CRAVER] (tracing the historical development of American labor unions and labor law).
Union organizers had to struggle against union-busting techniques from employers
(through use of yellow-dog contracts, black-listing, private security forces), from police,
and from a reluctant court system. See id.
2 See infra notes 37-64 and accompanying text for this Comment's review of
labor union history and of the development of American labor policy. See generally
Terry Collingsworth, American Labor Policy and the International Economy:
Clarifying Policies and Interests, 31 B.C. L. REV. 31 (1989) [hereinafter Collingsworth]
(noting that, by the early twentieth century, American labor had gained statutory
protection for the right to organize and collectively bargain and additional protection
through minimum wage laws, minimum hour laws, and basic health and safety
standards).
3 Through the purposeful adoption of statutes like the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), Congress established that unfair competition is the result of unfair labor
practices that lead to disruption in the flow of commerce and economic depressions "by
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by
preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within
and between industries." National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449-53, 455-
57 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). Furthermore,
Congress found that experience illustrates how protection of workers' basic rights
"safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow
of commerce" by establishing peaceful forms of dispute resolution and forging a balance
of bargaining power between labor and management. See id.
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increasingly challenged by the internationalization of the world
4
economy.
A White House report released in 1995 suggested that "the
United States can expect to reap large gains from international
trade in the near, medium, and long term."5 Free trade can not
only result in large gains, but also lead to serious problems for
American labor and labor policy. Such problems are caused by
multinational corporations (MNCs)6 that take advantage of "trade
without barriers" by shifting production to developing economies
in an effort to circumvent the higher production costs in the United
States (caused, in part, by higher U.S. labor standards).7 Thus,
some commentators suggest that a void in U.S. trade policy creates
an incentive for American MNCs to shift production out of the
United States in order to take advantage of the lower labor
standards in developing economies.8  This phenomenon
4 For example, the lowering of trade barriers with other nations and the
implementation of U.S. policies to encourage both private investment overseas and
unfettered trade among nations can result in the unforeseen effects of lost jobs and
chilled labor rights. See generally Collingsworth, supra note 2 (describing how a void
in U.S. policy creates an incentive for American-based multinational corporations to
move production overseas). For an explanation of the ways in which multinational
corporations (MNCs) are able to circumvent American labor policy, see infra notes 68-
98 and accompanying text.
5 Uruguay Round Experience, Services Will Dominate Future Trade Agenda, 12
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 296 (Feb. 15, 1995) (summarizing, in relevant part, the
annual Economic Report of the President). "[In the short term, e]conomic recoveries in
Europe and Japan are likely to boost U.S. exports and help narrow the U.S. trade
deficit .... In the longer term, positive changes in the economic policies of many
developing countries will lead to faster growth and a rise in their imports of capital
goods, a sector in which U.S. competitiveness is very high .... Id.
6 MNCs are corporations headquartered in one country with operations
disseminated throughout the world. These transnational ventures may set up shop in one
nation to gather raw materials, in one nation to manufacture component parts, and in still
another nation to assemble these parts. See Collingsworth, supra note 2, at 32 n.9.
7 See Robert F. Housman and Paul M. Orbuch, Integrating Labor and
Environmental Concerns into the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Look Back
and A Look Ahead, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 719 (1993) [hereinafter Housman]
(describing the concerns of American labor with respect to a shift in production to
Mexico as a result of the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement); see
also Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Conditioning Trade on Foreign Labor Law: The U.S.
Approach, 9 COMP. LAB. L.J. 253 (1988) [hereinafter Perez-Lopez] (describing U.S.
efforts to link trade with labor standards in an effort to curb unfair competition in the
international marketplace).
8 See Collingsworth, supra note 2, at 34-35. But see David Kennedy, Receiving
the International, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1994) (debunking the fears of the left that
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undermines the policies established by U.S. labor laws that were
enacted to ensure certain minimum standards for employees and a
more equitable distribution of power between labor and
management.9 This problem is exacerbated when MNCs then
import their goods back to the U.S. market." Savings realized in
production by companies are often not passed on to consumers in
the United States." Thus, MNCs win on all accounts, by both
exploiting lower labor standards abroad and by having duty-free
access to one of the most lucrative markets in the world.
2
As a result of the activities of MNCs, 3 American employees,
particularly those in low-skill, low-wage jobs, face dislocation as
employers move operations abroad to nations where production
costs can be kept down by lower labor costs.' 4  Furthermore,
encouraging or enabling MNCs to shift production abroad may
produce an in terroreum effect on domestic exercise of labor
rights, as unorganized employees are cautioned against organizing
and striking by the very real specter of permanent job loss.
globalization will necessarily profit the private/commercial sphere at the expense of the
public interest/governmental regulatory sphere).
9 See id. at 40-42.
10 See id. at 53 (referring to a 1982 estimate "that forty-six percent of all U.S.
imports are from affiliates of American companies producing goods in a foreign country
for export to the United States").
I See, e.g., Les Blumenthal, Cheap Labor Has U.S. Companies Racing for
Foothold in Indonesia, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 12, 1994, at A22 [hereinafter
Blumenthal] (noting that Nike produces its Cortez shoe line for $13.50 a pair in
Pouchen, Indonesia, and it sells the same shoes for a retail price of $50.00 a pair in the
United States).
12 See Collingsworth, supra note 2, at 53.
13 See id. at 45 (describing the MNC trend as a modem version of the "runaway
shop," whereby employers close plants and move to new locations to avoid unions).
14 Current estimates suggest that, even within the United States, labor costs for
unionized firms are ten to thirty percent higher than those of non-unionized firms. See
CRAVER, supra note 1, at 51. While it is difficult to assess with any accuracy the
number of jobs lost due to MNCs moving abroad, see Collingsworth, supra note 2, at
49, simple economics, as well as American labor history, indicates that, given the
opportunity, companies will shift production to the location offering them the lowest
cost. See id. at 51.
15 See Collingsworth, supra note 2, at 53-55; see also CRAVER, supra note 1, at 51
(suggesting that the costs of unionization in the United States can be quite high, placing
American unionized businesses "at a distinct disadvantage compared to their
unorganized competitors"). In the struggle for profits between management and labor,
labor often loses out because, "[w]hile capital-intensive technology is a relatively mobile
commodity, displaced employees are not easily transplanted to other geographical areas
or integrated into new occupations." CRAVER, supra note 1, at 45.
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Unfortunately, labor costs in developing economies are often
kept artificially low by repressive, anti-labor legislation and
governmental action.1 6 In effect, the governments of developing
nations may actually contribute to the exploitation of their own
citizens in an effort to attract MNCs to bolster their economies.17
I I At this point in history, global free trade seems inevitable. 8
Thus, the question becomes not whether but when; and, whatever
the ultimate global solution, the problems faced by American labor
as a result of the activities of MNCs and the dearth of labor laws
regulating MNCs must be addressed and resolved by U.S. policy
makers.
The purpose of this Comment is to explore the feasibility of a
shift in U.S. foreign trade policy toward one which, recognizing
the need for a balance between labor and management interests, is
geared toward protecting both U.S. and foreign labor. This
Comment will specifically concentrate on the viability of linking
labor concerns and free trade agreements to ensure that
international labor standards are upheld. 9 Part II of this Comment
will illustrate why a change in policy is needed.2" First, the
Comment will define U.S. labor policy by setting forth a brief
outline of American labor movement history.2  Second, the
Comment will contrast the struggle and achievements of U.S.
labor with a description of the ease with which MNCs circumvent
16 See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 11, at A22 (describing the "dark side" of some
developing countries, like Indonesia, to which MNCs relocate in search of lower labor
costs); Striking a Balance: Pressured by Workers and the West, Asia Fights to Stay
Competitive, ASIAWEEK, Oct. 26, 1994, at 40 [hereinafter Striking a Balance]
(illustrating the cost in lost foreign investment to Asian nations which democratize labor
relations).
17 "The governments of developing countries compete for the opportunity to
generate American. investment. They emphasize their significantly lower labor
costs.... the absence of labor organizations, and the minimal or inapplicable employee
protection laws." CRAVER, supra note 1, at 43.
is See CRAVER, supra note 1, at 119 (explaining that restricting free trade at this
point will produce potentially disastrous results for both the labor movement, in
particular, and the United States, in general).
For a more detailed discussion of the viability of linking labor concerns and
trade agreements, see infra notes 158-343 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 27-98 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 37-64 and accompanying text.
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established U.S. policy and exploit foreign labor forces.22 Part III
of the Comment will explore why current American labor laws are
ineffectual in precipitating a policy shift to one which links trade
with international labor standards so as to more effectively protect
labor interests throughout the world.23  Part IV will explore
possible solutions to this dilemma, specifically using the North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) to illustrate
the potential for linking free trade agreements to labor concerns.24
This discussion will also address the weaknesses of the solution
offered by the NAALC.2 Finally, Part V will review the concept
of linking trade with labor concerns and conclude that this is a
vital area for future exploration.26
II. The Need for Change: Should U.S. Corporations Be
Allowed to Do Abroad What They Cannot Do at Home?
In the twentieth century, the American labor movement has
achieved much for the working class. Unionized and non-
unionized employees have benefited from the struggle of
American unions. Now, the labor movement faces "challenges
that threaten its very existence."2 At the mid-century mark, union
members comprised thirty-five percent of all nonagricultural
employees in the United States; but those numbers dwindled to
just sixteen percent by 1991.29 Current figures suggest union
22 See infra notes 65-98 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 99-186 and accompanying text. Notably, many leaders from
nations with developing economies oppose international interference with labor relations
in their nations. See Eduardo Lachica, WTO's Meeting of Its Ministers To Face a Split,
U.S., Asian Nations Appear to Differ Over Agenda At December Gathering, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 13, 1996, at B7 ("[Indonesian President Suharto] told the annual meeting of
trade ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Jakarta that
discussion at the WTO of labor standards would be politically risky, untimely and
controversial .... ).
24 See infra notes 187-343 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 187-343 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 344-53 and accompanying text.
27 See CRAVER, supra note 1, at 5-6. Unorganized employees have indirectly
reaped benefits from organized labor's struggles, including higher wages, eight-hour
days, paid vacation, sick leave, health insurance, as well as nonmonetary gains like the
freedom from arbitrary discharge. See id.
28 Id. at 2.
29 See id.
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membership represents just thirteen percent of the nonagricultural
employees in the American work force," and, by the year 2000,
unions are predicted to have shrunk in membership to "a mere five
percent of private sector personnel."'" The reasons for this
diminution are manifold,32 but this Comment focuses on only two:
the rapidly expanding global economy and the reaction (or lack
thereof) of the U.S. government to the changing economic
landscape.33
An overview of American labor movement history is
fundamental in any thorough discussion of the need to link free
trade and labor concerns in U.S. foreign trade policy. First, the
Comment will detail domestic labor policy as it has developed.
3 4
Second, the description of the struggle to achieve some measure of
protection for U.S. employees provides a background against
which the Comment will contrast MNC practices. Finally, the
Comment will illustrate how the achievements obtained by labor
are undermined and the foreign labor forces are exploited by MNC
efforts to shop internationally for the least protected labor market
within which to set up plants and factories.36
A. Hard Fought Gains: A Brief History
Over the centuries, organized labor has served as the instigator
and facilitator of a major shift in the existence of American
workers from "fungible parts of the industrial machine"37 to human
beings with basic rights and a powerful, collective voice.3" Where
30 See Samuel Estricher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product
Markets, in THE LEGAL FuTuRE OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION 13 (Matthew W. Finkin
ed., 1994).
31 See CRAVER, supra note 1, at 2.
32 See CRAVER, supra note 1, at 34-55 (citing labor force demographics changes,
industrial and technological changes, global economic and industrial trends, employer
opposition to organizational rights, and sociological changes as reasons for the decline
in unionism).
33 See infra notes 99-343 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 37-67 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 68-87 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
37 Collingsworth, supra note 2, at 37.
38 See CRAVER, supra note 1, at I ("With all their shortcomings, the unions are the
only organized voice in America that working people have.") (citations omitted).
1996]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
employment was once synonymous with "exploitation, the
accumulation of capital, and the securing of profit by employers at
the expense of those who worked for them,"39 the employment
relationship now recognizes workers' rights that .were unheard of
to the nineteenth century laborer.4 °
Nineteenth century America viewed the employment
relationship as a freely bargained-for exchange in which the
employer bargained for labor and the laborer bargained for
wages.4' When the laborer agreed to the exchange of labor for
money, he or she necessarily agreed to submit to the absolute
control of the employer during the work day.42  This
characterization of the employment relationship persisted into the
twentieth century, repeatedly reinforced by the judicial system.43
The so-called "freedom of contract" model of the .employment
relationship was often interpreted in the employer's favor.44
39 Christopher L. Tomlins, Law and Power in the Employment Relationship, in
LABOR LAW IN AMERICA 71 (Christopher L. Tomlins and Andrew J. King, eds., 1992)
[hereinafter Tomlins].
40 See generally CRAVER, supra note 1 (reviewing the rights of workers in the
United States); Collingsworth, supra note 2 (describing the historic struggle which led
to the recognition of the rights of workers in the United States).
41 See Tomlins, supra note 39, at 72.
42 See id. at 73 ("[L]egally[,] the autonomy of the [employee] (which monetary
asymmetry in any case renders materially illusory in most cases) is confined to the
points of entry to and exit from the employment relationship.").
43 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a New York
statute limiting the working hours of bakers to ten hours a day, sixty hours a week
interferes with the right of contract between an employer and employees). Interestingly,
the Court in Lochner apparently viewed bakers differently, considering them of
sufficient intelligence to be able to "assert their rights and care for themselves" without
need of state action to equalize the bargaining process. See id. at 57. The United States
Supreme Court made an additional differentiation among workers when it held that the
"freedom of contract" model did not apply to all employees, just male employees. See
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908). The Court found that, while individuals
have the right to freely contract their labor, protective labor legislation was justified in
the case of women due to the differences between the sexes and, specifically, the
differences in bodily functions-particularly maternity. See id. at 422. The Court
explained that legislation differentiating between men and women in the employment
context was necessary to "secure a real equality of right" between male and female
workers. See id. at 422.
44 See, e.g., U.S. v. Martin, 94 U.S. 79, 104 (1876) (holding that, despite a U.S.
statute requiring an eight hour work day for federal employees, "principals... are
entitled to employ as many workmen, and of whatever degree of skill, and at whatever
price they think fit and ... the hours of labor and the price to be paid are left to the
determination of the parties interested"); Rice v. Dwight Mfg. Co., 56 Mass. 80, 88
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Another typical characterization of the employment
relationship was that of a property right."5 Predictably, this
"property," which was considered the laborer's for the purpose of
the freely bargained-for employment contract, was controlled by
the employer within the scope of the work day.46 In fact, labor was
considered such an important property right and the freedom to
contract -for this property so fundamental that nineteenth and early-
twentieth century courts were reluctant to hold that labor statutes
were intended to alter the status quo as between labor and
management in any tangible way.47 In view of these conditions,
the nineteenth century employment relationship in America has
been characterized by some historians and commentators as one of
"structured inequality.
'AS
Early labor unions strove to overcome the prevailing view of
labor as a commodity to be exploited.49 These unions were mostly
short-lived attempts at organizing workers to overcome their often
miserable working conditions and were generally met by harsh
(1848) (holding that an employer, whose employee allegedly agreed to a year's
employment contract and then left after several weeks, would not be held liable to pay
her at all for the time she did work, unless it was found that the employer had waived or
rescinded the original contract by agreeing to pay her for that partial amount in
exchange for any act of service that put the employee "to personal inconvenience,
though of no value to the [employer]").
45 See, e.g., Eden v. People, 161 111. 296, 302 (1896) ("The income derived from [a
barber shop owner's] place, and his own labor [sic] and the labor of his employees, are
his property, but the legislature has by [passing a statute prohibiting barber shops from
dbing business on Sundays] taken that property from him.").
46 See Little Miami R.R. Co. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio 415, 433 (1851) ("The employer
has no more control over the person he has employed, outside of the service to be
rendered, than he has over the person of any other individual .... ).
47 See, e.g., People v. Phyfe, 136 N.Y. 554, 559 (1893). The New York court held
that "[r]ights and liberties which have been enjoyed without question from time
immemorial are not to be abridged or denied by legislative action except by clear,
unambiguous and preemptory language." Id. So, a statute which established maximum
hours for railroad employees without specifically stating that no railroad employer could
contract with an employee to work more than the maximum was held to be "but a
statutory definition of what shall constitute a day's labor in certain employments [which]
would control in any controversy.., in the absence of an express agreement to the
contrary." Id. at 557-58.
48 See Tomlins, supra note 39, at 71. In the employment realm, "government was
devolved upon the employer, vested in him as a matter of policy, and in some
circumstances backed by criminal sanction." Id. at 73.
49 See Collingsworth, supra note 2, at 37 ("[L]abor was viewed as an exploitable
commodity that was necessary for industrial development.").
1996]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
resistance." Despite the short-lived nature of these early unions,
each provided the momentum for the other, thereby carrying
forward the struggle for equality with management. Each of the
early unions sought to equalize the relationship between labor and
management; however, each union approached issues differently
and employed unique strategies. 1 In general, however, each union
supported goals that would allow employees to obtain "a proper
share of the wealth that they create,"52 eight-hour work days,53 and
equal remuneration for equal work.
4
50 See id. at 36. Among these early labor unions were the National Labor Union
(NLU), which lasted from 1866-1877; the Knights of Labor, which lasted from 1869-
late-1880s; the Women's Trade Union League (WTUL), founded in 1903; the
International Ladies Garment Workers Union, established in 1909; and the Industrial
Workers of the World (IWW), which lasted from 1905-late-1920s. See CRAVER, supra
note 1, at 12-23.
51 For example, the NLU was opposed to strikes and preferred to rely on
arbitration to resolve labor disputes. See CRAVER, supra note 1, at 12. The Knights of
Labor sought the consolidation of all labor groups to strengthen the growing labor
movement. See id. at 13. To help accomplish their broad goals, the Knights utilized the
tactics of the sympathy strike and political involvement. See id. at 14. The involvement
in politics included the Knights sponsoring worker's party candidates in thirty-four of
the thirty-five states that then comprised the United States. See id. at 14. By contrast,
the IWW was stridently radical in its politics, supporting many socialist candidates
including a socialist candidate for President in the 1912 campaign. See id. at 22.
52 Id. at 13.
See id. at 12.
54 See id. Perhaps the most well-known and most enduring of these early unions
was the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Founded in 1886, the organization
admitted to its membership various trade unions and did not follow the political inertia
among other unions to support separate labor political parties. See id. at 18. Despite
opposition from employers, governmental officials, and the judicial system, the AFL
successfully pushed forward the labor agenda. See id. at 19 ("Private guards, state
militia, and federal troops were employed to negate the impact of collective worker
action. Judges and prosecutors were used to imprison those union leaders with the
temerity to defy injunctive orders.") Notably, the AFL was organized and represented
only members of crafts or artisans, the "elite" of the working class. See THOMAS
GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE You ON? 42 (1991). The AFL rejected the mass of
industrial workers, describing them as "not union material." See id.
However, not all labor organizers were blind to the possibility of unionizing
industrial workers. For instance, in the 1930s, John L. Lewis and the Congress of
Industrial Organizations (CIO) launched a radical, all-out organizing campaign,
significantly contributing to the rise of labor unions in the United States. See id. at 45-
46. In 1955, the AFL merged with the CIO, and the combined labor union, known as
the AFL-CIO, became an important national organization wielding significant influence.
See generally CRAVER, supra note 1, at 31. Today, the AFL-CIO remains an important,
although not quite as strong, voice for labor. For example, the AFL-CIO continues to be
an advocate for labor in the halls of Congress, regularly sending its task force on trade to
appear before two Congressional subcommittees. Cf. Gephardt Against Broad Fast
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The continuing efforts of labor unions began to pay off by the
early twentieth century. From a U.S. Congress, wary of labor
unions, that adopted criminal syndicalism statutes aimed at
curtailing the actions of labor movements,55 to a Congress that
passed legislation that accepted the need for a balance of power
between employees and employers-the Congressional view of
unions slowly evolved. Gradually, the government began to shift
towards a policy that protected commerce through establishing and
maintaining a balance between employers and employees.56 With
the passage of acts such as the Railway Labor Act of 1926"7 and
the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),58  Congress
embraced the new policy; nevertheless, it was not until 1937 that
the Supreme Court finally sealed the success for labor activists
when it upheld the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 9 in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp." Through the NLRA,
Congress established that
the policy of the United States [is] to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
Track in Absence of Administration Plan, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 857-58
(May 17, 1995) [hereinafter Gephardt].
55 See CRAVER, supra note 1, at 22. These statutes prohibited "any 'doctrine which
advocates crime, violence, sabotage or other unlawful methods as a means of industrial
or political reform,"' id., but, in practice, the statutes were often used to mitigate
arguably benign activity. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)
(upholding a conviction under California's Criminal Syndicalism Act where defendant,
an organizer of the Communist Labor Party in California, sponsored a proposal that the
party utilize the political process to achieve its ends, and noting that the defendant was
arrested for "knowingly becoming a member of a group organized to advocate criminal
syndicalism" when her proposal was subsequently rejected and another, more militant
proposal was adopted by her party).
56 See Collingsworth, supra note 2, at 43 ("The resolution of the initial [labor-
management] conflict was not entirely one-sided. Congress did recognize that in order
for workers to have the opportunity to improve their lives, employers had to be able to
remain in business.").
57 Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926).
58 National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90,48 Stat. 195 (1933).
59 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449-53, 455-57 (1935) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994)).
60 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See infra text accompanying note 102 for a brief description
of the Court's holding.
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organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection.6
Thus, in the United States, labor policy shifted its focus from
protecting employers' freedom to contract with employees, to
protecting free and unencumbered commerce by securing
fundamental freedoms for employees.62 Current American labor
policy, as established in the early twentieth century, recognizes the
"inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract,
and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms
of ownership association .... .63 This inequality, if not redressed,
is recognized as a serious threat to commerce.6
Despite organized labor's centuries of effort, today, MNCs are
uniquely situated to defeat the gains achieved by unions.65 MNCs
take advantage of the opportunities available due to the
liberalization of international free trade by simply uprooting
production in the United States and moving it to other nations that
do not provide similar labor protections; thus, American
employees are left jobless, their rights under American labor
policy chilled.66 Without linking free trade to some kind of
international labor standards, workers-both domestic and
61 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended
at29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994)).
62 See id. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text for a description of the
freedom of contract model of the employment relationship.
63 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended
at29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994)).
64 See id. Some have suggested that one way to protect labor in an increasingly
global marketplace is through transnational unionization. See generally Roger R.
Blanpain, The Kenneth M Piper Lecture: Transnational Regulations of the Labor
Relations of Multinational Enterprises, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 909 (1982) [hereinafter
Blanpain] (discussing the importance of transnational unionism). While this is an,
interesting solution to the problems faced by labor all over the world, the focus of this
Comment is on the viability of linking labor concerns with trade agreements.
65 See generally Collingsworth, supra note 2 (describing the effects of MNC
activities on unions and the right to collectively bargain in the United States).
66 See id. at 46-55. Collingsworth describes the phenomenon of chilled labor
rights as an oppressive fear among employees that the exercise of their rights under the
NLRA will result in a loss of employment. See id. at 53-55. Thus, employees become
reluctant to organize. See id.
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foreign-lose, 67 and, subsequently, the hard-won domestic labor
policy is undermined.
B. MNCs and Foreign Employees
Given the strong concern expressed in the NLRA that
inequitable labor practices encourage strife and threaten the
61disruption of commerce, the current laissez faire approach to
MNC activities abroad seems starkly ironic. In the MNC practice
of exporting production to avoid higher labor costs and more
stringent U.S. labor laws lurks the dark echoes of a past inequity
best left far behind in the dim recesses of history.
Current employment trends in the United States show a
"hollowing out" of the economic class hierarchy, with decreasing
numbers in the middle class and increasing polarity between the
richest and poorest Americats. 69 Some observers attribute this
phenomenon to the willingness of companies, particularly MNCs,
to take the "low road" to profitability through lowering labor costs,
rather than through investing in employee skill development and
new technologies to augment the productivity of existing
employees.70
One particularly distressing practice is that of the
"screwdriver" firm, which sets up production in a developing
economy with labor surpluses and low labor standards and exploits
that nation's work force so long as the standards-and thus the
67 See infra notes 68-98 and accompanying text for a description of how domestic
and foreign workers are adversely affected by a lack of labor protections in trade
agreements.
68 See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §151 (1994).
69 See Bennett Harrison, The Dark Side of Flexible Production, 13 NAT'L
PRODUCTIVITY REv. 479, 498 (1994) (hereinafter Harrison] (citing the reasons for this
trend as, among other things, the weakness of the U.S. labor movement, the absence of
any other worker-representative groups to fill the void left by disappearing unions, and
the global economy and the rapidity with which the United States was thrust into it).
70 See id at 496; see also BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GATT to WTO 263
(1995) [hereinafter HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI] ("[A]n additional source of concern ... is
that liberalization of trade and closer integration of the world economy may lead to a
race to the bottom, with countries that have high standards being forced to lower them if
they want their firms to remain competitive with those in industrializing countries.").
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costs-remain low.7  As soon as the economy of the developing
nation starts to shift upward with increased international
investment, the "screwdriver" company uproots its operation to
avoid the often concomitant increase in labor standards and moves
to the next developing economy on the list, often repeating this
process again and again."
Supporters of MNCs transferring operations overseas,
however, advance a "ladder theory" in support of their position. ?
The ladder theory is described in the following manner:
A developing country begins with a low-skill.., industry. As the
work force matures and increases in skill, more advanced assembly
operations.., are introduced. In addition to transferring technology to
the work force, these assembly operations integrate, or form backward
linkages, with the domestic economy. Local industries grow and
displace foreign firms as the major source of assembled inputs ....
[Eventually,] the country 'climbs' into an industrialized state.74
Thus, these advocates argue that their contributions help
developing economies grow.75 As examples, supporters point to
"newly industrialized Southeast Asian countries, which
[supporters argue]..., began their development in apparel
assembly and then progressed until... they became industrial
powers."76  Similarly, these "ladder" experiences are being
repeated in the nations throughout the Caribbean, Central
America, and Mexico.77
While MNCs are not inherently evil institutions, they certainly
71 See M.G. Pillai, Malaysian Women Catch Nomad's Eye; Migrant Industries
Bring Social and Economic Change to Rural Areas, WORLDPAPER, Aug. 1994, at 10.
72 See id. However, this screwdriver procedure may have unseen benefits for the
economies of developing countries. For example, Mahathir Mohamed, the prime
minister of Malaysia, "does not mince words when describing his vision of Malaysia as
a cog in the global industrial machine. To that end, he has assiduously courted [MNCs]
to locate their subsidiaries--even nomadic ones-in rural areas so that the agrarian
economy will be transformed into an industrial economy." Id.
73 See KURT PETERSEN, The Maquiladora Revolution in Guatemala 4-6 (1992).
Id. at 5.
75 See Blumenthal, supra note 11, at A22; see also infra notes 77-81 and
accompanying text.
76 PETERSEN, supra note 73, at 5.
77 See PETERSEN, supra note 73, at 5-6.
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illustrate with striking clarity an ethical and economic dilemma
facing both the United States and the world as the economies of all
nations become increasingly interdependent.7" For example, Nike
has been blazing a trail through southeast Asia,79 prompting
concern from U.S. politicians"0 and labor groups,8' alike. Nike is
incorporated in the United States; however, "not one of the [forty]
million pairs of running shoes that Nike produces annually is
manufactured within the United States: Everything is
subcontracted from elsewhere." 2
At Nike's factory in Pouchen, Indonesia, workers (mostly
women with an average age of seventeen) sleep twelve to a room
in dormitories and earn two dollars per day.83 While conditions
like these may sound unthinkable to the Western worker, Nike
78 But see Douglass Cassel, Essay, Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights
Revolution?, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1963 (1996) (describing the efforts of some MNCs
to improve the labor standards and human rights in the foreign nations in which they
operate through adoption of global human rights codes of conduct).
79 Blumenthal, supra note 11, at A22. But see Cassel, supra note 78, at 1973
(discussing the fact that Nike, among other MNCs, has recently adopted a global code of
conduct to address issues of human rights in its foreign operations).
80 See, e.g., Campaign Nixes Gifts Made by Sweatshops, UPI, Dec. 16, 1994. In
1994, Rep. Marcy Kaptur (D-Ohio) launched a program aimed at taking "'away the
cloak of secrecy that shrouds the billions of dollars of profits being made by a few off
foreign trade, at the expense of the many,"' and taking special aim at Nike. See id.
Among labor abuses in developing economies mentioned by Kaptur were child labor
and abuse of women workers. See id.
81 See id. Labor groups joined Kaptur in targeting Nike, "which they said employs
women and children in China to produce shoes at approximately $8 per pair that are then
sold in the United States for 10 times that amount." Id.
82 Harrison, supra note 69, at 492. Harrison describes Nike as a network firm,
capturing a principle he calls "concentration without centralization. That principle is
intended to capture the continuing dispersal of production, but ultimately under the
technical and financial control of managers in a relatively small number of
multiregional, multisectoral, multinational corporations and their strategic allies." Id.
Nike's production is set up in two levels; the first involves "developed partners,"
firms in Asian countries like Taiwan and South Korea which work on Nike's most
expensive lines of footwear. See id. These "developed partners" have more input and
share more responsibility for design and production. See id. The firms in the first tier
"contract out most of the work to local low-wage subcontractors." Id. At the second
level are not only "volume producers," suppliers who sell to many different
corporations, including Nike, but also "'developing sources'-producers located in
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and China. These are the lowest-wage, low- and
semiskilled operations that Nike is gradually upgrading ('bringing along')." Id. at 493.
83 See Blumenthal, supra note 11, at A22. It should be noted, however, that two
dollars a day represents twice the national minimum wage. See id.
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treats these workers well by Indonesian standards. s4 Nike provides
its Pouchen employees with "three meals a day, dormitories, a
medical clinic, soccer field, three mosques and a Catholic
chapel."85 Nike certainly believes that its production of shoes in
nations with developing economies, like Indonesia, performs a
vital service to the developing nation and its citizens.86 In fact,
Nike "hastens to point out that in every country where it has done
business, the economy has expanded rapidly and a middle class
has emerged. Nike has been in on the ground floor of each
nation's industrial emergence."87
Nike is not, however, alone in sending its operations abroad.
American MNCs numbered 140 in 1973 and had combined annual
sales of $380 billion, 8 prompting some to predict that, by 1990,
300 MNCs would dominate world trade. 9 Two-thirds of the
dominant MNCs were expected to be American.9 In fact, "three-
hundred [of the] largest [MNCs] ... now control about one fourth
of the world's productive assets." 9' Many American corporations
have taken advantage of the opportunities brought about by free
trade; for example, General Motors, Ford, Chrysler," Levi Strauss,
and Nordstrom 9 have shifted either operations or supply contracts
overseas.
Within our own national borders, the practices of these MNCs
are "proliferat[ing] low-wage, insecure employment" as well as
driving the increasing trend toward polarization of wages across
the socioeconomic spectrum. 94 Outside the United States, MNCs
84 See id.
85 Id. The dormitories at the Nike plant are "spacious compared to most in
Indonesia, where an entire extended family can share a one-room shack." Id.
See id.
87 Id.
88 See CRAVER, supra note 1, at 42. This figure exceeded the "gross national
product of every nation except the United States and the Soviet Union." Id.
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 See Cassel, supra 78, at 1979.
92 See Collingsworth, supra note 2, at 53.
93 See Blumenthal, supra note 11, at A22.
See Harrison, supra note 69 at 479. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying
text for a more detailed discussion of this trend in the U.S. economy.
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are spreading the specter of our not-so-distant labor past by taking
advantage of incentives offered both by the U.S. government95 and
foreign governments96 to move production to foreign soil and
exploit labor abroad. In addition to a lack of regulation of MNCs'
foreign labor practices, American courts have refused to extend
domestic law jurisdiction to cover the actions of such transnational
employers,97 regardless of their American contacts; thus, the courts
de facto encourage MNC production abroad thereby undermining
American labor policy98 as well as international labor standards.
III. The Law as It Stands: Problems with Extraterritoriality,
Jurisdiction, and Sovereignty
In the search for solutions to the growing labor concern with
MNC activity, specifically, and globalization, generally, one might
be tempted to consider the simple possibility of applying
American labor laws to companies that are incorporated in the
United States, regardless of where their actions take place.
However, this is not a viable option because of a strong
95 For a description of some of the ways in which the U.S. government provides
incentives to MNC capital investment in foreign nations with developing economies, see
infra notes 99-186 and accompanying text.
96 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the
governments of developing nations encourage MNC investment.
97 These jurisdictional decisions reinforce the domestic established social hierarchy
and its definition of who "we" are (that is, who falls within the category of those we
want to protect and privilege with our laws) and who "we" are not, a technique used
traditionally to justify the disenfranchisement of white women and all people of color in
the United States. See Note, Constructing the State Extraterritorially: Jurisdictional
Discourse, the National Interest, and Transnational Norms, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1273,
1293 (1990) [hereinafter Extraterritorially]. Not-so subtle undercurrents of racism,
sexism, and cultural/ethnic superiority may also be inherent in the choices made by
MNCs to relocate production abroad (as well as in the inattentiveness of the American
court system and Congress to address unfair labor practices when they arise in these
contexts). To illustrate, consider the hypothetical MNC that deliberately selects a
developing Asian nation of "lesser" status in which to locate a plant. Predictably, the
MNC primarily hires young, Asian women to work there for excessively low (by
Western standards) wages. For a more concrete example, see supra notes 78-87 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Nike's production techniques in Indonesia.
98 See generally Collingsworth, supra note 2, at 51 ("When domestic production is
replaced by foreign production for the U.S. market, no one can seriously debate that
employers made this move to avoid the costs associated with labor policy. This is the
modem runaway shop that threatens the gains represented by labor policy, as well as
other American interests.").
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presumption against extraterritoriality,99 as can be revealed by a
brief review of the application of American labor laws by U.S.
courts.'
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Theoretically, American courts have the constitutional
authority to apply domestic labor law to American MNCs. Thus,
the issue at hand is not one of constitutional conflict. The
Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes."'01 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
held since 1937 that labor relations fall within Congress'
Commerce Clause power.02 Thus, theoretically, American courts
have the constitutional authority to apply domestic labor law to
American MNCs.
Instead, since "Congress is presumed... to be concerned with
domestic conditions first ... laws generally apply only in those
geographical areas or territories subject to the legislative control of
the United States, absent Congress' clearly expressed affirmative
aim to the contrary."'0 3  Therefore, unless otherwise specified,
American law only applies within the boundaries of the United
States or its territories. This presumption against extraterritorial
application of American law is an especially strong one that has
withstood repeated challenges in the area of labor law.'04 Two
assumptions form the basis upon which this presumption is
founded: jurisdiction and sovereignty.
99 See infra notes 101-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
presumption against extraterritoriality.
100 See infra notes 117-57 and accompanying text for a review of the way U.S.
courts have approached the issue of applying American labor laws outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.
101 U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
102 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding that the
National Labor Relations Act's grant of power to organize and collectively bargain is
not an impermissible exercise of Commerce Clause power).
103 Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Prod., Inc., 968 F.2d 191, 193-94 (2d
Cir. 1992).
104 See infra notes 117-57 and accompanying text for a brief overview of relevant
case law.
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1. Jurisdiction
Whether a court will or will not hear a case brought before it
depends upon the scope of that court's jurisdiction, and
jurisdiction is often bounded by national borders. '05
Extraterritorial jurisdiction involves the exercise of a nation's
jurisdiction outside the boundaries of that nation. The doctrine
surrounding extraterritorial jurisdiction evolved over time, and
courts that have considered extraterritorial jurisdiction have
established and applied various tests.' Regardless of which test is
used, however, national boundaries play an important function in
determining whether an American court has jurisdiction over a
particular case. Hence, extraterritorial application of jurisdiction
"remains grounded in national categorizations."' 1 7 In other words,
a nation's jurisdiction generally extends to its borders and no
farther. 108
105 See Extraterritorially, supra note 97, at 1274.
106 See id. The doctrine began in the form of the strict national boundaries test as
recently expressed by the Second Circuit in Labor Union of Pico Korea. 968 F.2d at
191. See supra text accompanying note 103 for the Second Circuit's modem
formulation of the strict national boundaries test.
The next evolution was the effects doctrine developed in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). The effects doctrine enables
nations to regulate activity beyond their borders that has an actual effect within the
territorial boundaries of that nation, even when the actor is an alien. See
Extraterritorially, supra note 97, at 1277 n.21; see also Frank Balzano, Comment,
Extraterritorial Application of the National Labor Relations Act, 62 U. CIN. L. REV.
573, 578-79 (1993) [hereinafter Balzano] (describing the effects doctrine test).
The final evolution is represented by the "reasonable factors" test as expressed
in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law. See Extraterritorially, supra note
97, at 1274 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401(a) (1987)).
The two-part analysis under the Restatement test includes first determining a territorial
or national link sufficient to support the assertion of jurisdiction, and then analyzing the
link based on a specific set of factors. See id.
107 Extraterritorially, supra note 97, at 1274.
108 While carving jurisdiction up along national boundaries is assumed to make
sense in terms of deciding/settling the legal rights of individuals in conflict, at least one
commentator argues that national boundaries often cut across transnational norms-
norms which may, in fact, make more sense as boundaries in determining jurisdiction
than do artificially imposed territorial boundaries. See Extraterritorially, supra note 97,
at 1274. Thus, this commentator argues, certain cases and controversies have an
international dimension that is subverted by the arbitrary truncation of jurisdiction along
national borders. See id. at 1273. For example, it is not difficult to imagine a situation
in which a foreign employee, hired abroad by an American MNC, brings suit in a U.S.
court to address poor working conditions or a discriminatory discharge. In determining
the proper jurisdiction of a case with those facts, it may make more intuitive sense for
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While some commentators urge that, in certain situations,
jurisdiction should be exercised across national boundaries," 9
American courts have been reluctant to step into the realm of
international relations without explicit direction from Congress."'
Therefore, the question of whether an American labor law, will
apply outside the territorial boundaries of the United States is a
question of statutory construction, rather than choice of laws."'
Before hearing a case requiring application of U.S. labor law
abroad, courts must first determine whether Congress intended the
statute to apply abroad."' In this way, courts focus on interpreting
congressional intent as expressed in the statute, rather than on
whether an American law, rather than a foreign law, should apply
in a given situation.
2. Sovereignty
Sovereignty forms the second fundamental basis for the
presumption against extraterritorial application of a nation's
laws." 3 Any restriction of a nation's. exclusive jurisdiction within
the American court to hear the case because the MNC's relationship to both the United
States and its host country cuts across national boundaries in such a way as to render
extraterritorial jurisdiction appropriate.
109 See id. (asserting that people create an imagined community of sameness in their
minds through the concept of the nation, thereby often obscuring normative views of
transnational appeal). The state should not define the limits of jurisdiction, rather
jurisdiction should define the boundaries of the state. See id.
See Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc., 932 F.2d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 1991)
(stating the proposition that in order for the court to "run interference in such a delicate
field of international relations there must be present [an explanation of] the affirmative
intention of Congress"). See also Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Products,
Inc., 968 F.2d at 195 (suggesting that, while free trade and the global economy may
make it "increasingly possible that foreign industry might affect commerce" between a
foreign nation and a state, the assertion of American labor laws abroad "would
inevitably lead to embarrassment in foreign affairs and be entirely infeasible in actual
practice") (quoting McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372
U.S. 10, 19 (1963)).
I See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 449 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (stating that
the Court's task in determining whether Congress has exercised its authority to regulate
commerce extraterritorially is a matter of statutory construction); Cruz, 932 F.2d at 225
(stating that the applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act to foreign employees is "a
matter of statutory interpretation rather than choice of law analysis").
112 See infra notes 117-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of how courts
have decided this question for labor laws.
n1 Some commentators posit that the concept of absolute territorial sovereignty
arose with the emergence of the nation-state. • See Extraterritorially, supra note 97, at
1276.
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its own territory is an implicit "diminution of its sovereignty to the
extent of the restriction." 4  Any extraterritorial application of
American law in regulating an activity taking place wholly on
foreign soil would, therefore, necessarily conflict with the foreign
nation's sovereignty within its own borders."' In that case, a
foreign nation would almost certainly reject such an imposition,
leading to a potentially tricky diplomatic situation. To avoid such
conflicts, courts respect the. sovereignty of other nations and
curtail their jurisdiction along national lines."6
B. The Precedents Against Extraterritoriality in American
Labor Law
In the arena of extraterritorial application of labor law,
American courts have followed a long line of precedent in
adherence to the presumption against extraterritoriality. This
adherence to the presumption has remained virtually unshakable,
regardless of the citizenship of either employee or employer.'
The following is a brief overview of attempts at extraterritorial
application of labor law, focusing on four major labor statutes to
illustrate the strength of this precedent."8
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"'
Title VII has been used within the United States to protect
against various discriminatory practices. However, the U.S.
Supreme Court declined -to extend application of Title VII to
114See Extraterritorially, supra note 97, at 1276 (quoting Chief Justice Marshall
from The Schooner Exch. v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812)).
115 See Extraterritorially, supra note 97, at 1280 ("[R]ules of extraterritorial
jurisdiction historically have been governed by the twin principles of sovereignty over
national territory and sovereignty over national citizens .....
116 See id.
117 See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); McCulloch v.
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963); Labor Union of Pico
Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Prod., Inc., 968 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1992); Cruz v. Chesapeake
Shipping, Inc., 932 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1991).
18 This subsection will briefly examine attempted extraterritorial applications of
Title VII, the National Labor Relations Act, the Labor Management Relations Act, and
the Fair Labor Standards Act.
119 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1, to e-17 (1988), Title VII prohibits discriminatory
employment practices on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, or national origin.
See id. § 2000e-2.
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American employees working in foreign countries for American
employers in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. 20
In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., the petitioner-an
American employed abroad by an American employer--argued
that Congress' intent to apply Title VII to U.S. employers
anywhere in the world was revealed in the "broad jurisdictional
language"'' 1  of the statute.22  Moreover, petitioner argued that
Congress' express refusal to apply the statute to aliens employed
outside any state indicated its intent that the statute should apply to
U.S. citizens working outside any state for U.S. employers.
23
Noting that Congress knew how to express its intent to apply
legislation abroad, 24 the Court held that, while they had provided
persuasive arguments for the extraterritorial application of Title
VII, the petitioners had not overcome the strong presumption
against such an application.'25 Here, regardless of the fact that both
the petitioner and his employer were American nationals, any
discussion of the merits of petitioner's case was precluded by an
absolute adherence to the presumption against extraterritoriality.26
120 499 U.S. 244, 246-47 (1991). Petitioner Ali Boureslan was a naturalized U.S.
citizen hired by a subsidiary of Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) in Houston
and later transferred to the parent companyin Saudi Arabia. See id. at 247. Boureslan
filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and,
subsequently, he filed suit in a Texas district court charging that he was "harassed and
ultimately discharged by [Aramco in Saudi Arabia] on account of his race, religion, and
national origin." Id.
121 Id. at 249. Specifically, petitioners asserted "that since Title VII defines 'States'
to include States, the District of Columbia, and specified territories, the clause 'between
a State and any place outside thereof must be referring to areas beyond the territorial
limit of the United States." Id. at 249-50. The Court responded to these arguments by
asserting that if it allowed even plausible arguments such as those presented by
petitioners to "override the presumption against extraterritorial application, there would
be little left of the presumption." Id. at 253.
122 See id. at 249.
123 See id.
124 See id. at 258.
125 See id. at 250. Presumably, nothing short of an expressed congressional intent
to apply Title VII abroad would have overcome the presumption in this case.
126 Other courts have ruled similarly on the question of applying Title VII
extraterritorially. See, e.g., Lemnitzer v. Philippine Airlines, 783 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D.
Cal. 1991) (holding that, under an agreement between the Philippines and the United
States, a Filipino corporation with operations in America was not subject to Title VII
when expressing its preference for Filipino employees over American employees);
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2. National Labor Relations Act"7
Another example of the court system's reluctance to apply
U.S. labor law extraterritorially can be found in McCulloch v.
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,'28 in which the
U.S. Supreme Court considered the applicability of the National
Labor Relations Act to foreign seamen.'29 In reviewing an NLRB
decision to apply the NLRA to foreign seamen employed by a
Lavrov v. NCR Corp., 600 F. Supp. 923 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (ruling that Title VII is not
applicable to foreign corporations, at least with respect to employment in other
countries, where an American employee who sought and was denied a position with a
foreign subsidiary of an American corporation brought suit for sex discrimination under
Title VII).
127 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988). The NLRA protected the rights of the American
working class to freely associate, organize, and collectively bargain with their employers
and established the National Labor Relations Board to act as a mediator when disputes
between employers and labor unions arise. See generally Balzano, supra note 106
(arguing that the NLRA should not be applied outside the borders of the United States).
128 372 U.S. 10 (1963); see also Incres S.S. Co., Ltd. v. International Maritime
Worker's Union, 372 U.S. 24, 24 (1963) (holding that the "National Labor Relations
Act is inapplicable to the maritime operations of foreign-flag ships employing alien
seamen" where an American union picketed two foreign flagged vessels while they were
anchored off New York in an attempt to organize the foreign seamen aboard); NLRB v.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964) (holding that a union
which refused to work on any ship that had traded with Cuba was not a labor dispute as
defined by the NLRA).
129 In MeCulloch, a Honduran corporation and the union that had originally
represented its employees in a collective bargaining agreement filed suit to challenge a
ruling by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) which applied the NLRA to some
Honduran-owned vessels and their Honduran crews. See McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 15 (1963).
The NLRB was responding to a petition filed by the National Maritime Union of
America, AFL-CIO (NMU) which sought authorization to represent the seamen aboard
some Honduran-flagged vessels for the purposes of collective bargaining. See id. at 13.
In its review of the facts, the NLRB determined that the vessels represented part of a
single maritime operation headed by the New Jersey corporation, United Fruit
Company. See id. at 13-15. United Fruit Company was the beneficial owner of the
Honduran corporation, Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A. (Empresa). See id. at 13.
United Fruit Company's business involved the "cultivation, gathering, transporting and
sale" of many Central American and South American agricultural products, for which it
maintained a fleet of vessels. See id. Thirteen of this fleet were flagged under the colors
of Honduras and were operated by Empresa, which time chartered the ships to United
Fruit Company. See id. Based on the connection between the American beneficial
owner and the Honduran subsidiary that owned the vessels, the NLRB found the NLRA
to apply. See id. at 15. To reach this conclusion, the NLRB used a minimum contacts
test in which it weighed the vessels' American contacts against their Honduran contacts.
See id. at 14-15. The NLRB found enough American contacts to conclude that the
vessels were engaged in "commerce" for the purposes of the NLRA such that NMU
should be able to hold an election in which the seamen choose between the American
union and another Honduran union. See id. at 15.
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foreign company, the Court noted that Congress does, indeed,
have constitutional authority to regulate foreign seamen.' Next,
the Court asked whether Congress had expressly chosen to do so
within the confines of the NLRA.'3 The Court, after reviewing the
legislative history of the NLRA, decided that Congress had not
made explicit its intent with respect to application of the statute
outside the' confines of the United States and its territories. 32  In
reaching its holding, the Court seemed to give great weight-to the
existence of a Honduran law which directly conflicted with the
decision of the NLRB. 133  In McCulloch, the Court found the
international reprisals that might result from an invasion of
Honduran sovereignty 34 and the lack of expressed congressional
intent to be a sufficient invocation of the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Based upon this presumption, 'the court held,
not surprisingly, that the foreign employees of a foreign employer
were deemed outside the scope of American labor law.
130 Seeid.at 17.
See id. at 17.
132 See McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 18 ("[The legislative history] inescapably describes
the boundaries of the Act as including only the workingmen of our own country and its
possessions." (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 144
(1957))). In reaching its decision, the Court discounted the minimum contacts test
established by the NLRB. Id. at 19 ("Such activity would raise considerable disturbance
not only in the field of maritime law but in our international relations as well.").
133 See McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21. The Honduran labor law cited would have
prohibited NMU from representing the Honduran seamen. See id. at 14. The Court
feared that applying the NLRA abroad in this manner would infringe upon Honduran
sovereignty and, therefore, "invite retaliatory action from other nations as well as
Honduras." Id. at 21. The Court also deferred to the "well-established rule of
international law that the law of the flag state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a
ship." Id. But see Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping Inc., 932 F.2d 218, 231 (3d Cir. 1991)
("Flying the American flag is a necessary but not sufficient condition for seamen to
obtain the benefits [of American labor law]."). The Third Circuit's opinion in Cruz,
apparently, represents an exception to the "general rule" that the law of the flag state
governs. See infra notes 149-157 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cruz.
134 See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
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3. Labor Management Relations Act"'
Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Prod., Inc."'36 provides
a third example of the strong presumption against
extraterritoriality. In Labor Union of Pico, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that the Labor Management Relations
Act (LMRA) does not apply to collective bargaining agreements
executed between a foreign labor union and the wholly owned
foreign subsidiary of an American corporation.'37 Plaintiffs first
argued that, based on the plain meaning of the statutory language,
the LMRA applied.' To support this assertion, plaintiffs pointed
to language in the statute in which Congress expressly stated that
the LMRA was to be used "without regard to the citizenship of the
parties."'39 However, the Second Circuit rejected this argument.1
40
Instead, the court held that the "without regard to citizenship"
language in the LMRA merely established federal question
jurisdiction14 1 (and thus, original jurisdiction in federal courts).42
135 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144 (1988). The LMRA augments the function of the NLRA
by defining the liabilities of and restrictions on labor and management and by outlining
the procedural and jurisdictional rules for suits regarding the violation of a contract
between an employer and a labor organization. See id. Furthermore, the LMRA makes
it unlawful for an employer or a labor relations expert to offer and a labor organization
or its representative to accept any kind of payment in exchange for influence over the
employees' exercise of their rights to organize and collectively bargain. See id.
136 968 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1992), see also Benz, 353 U.S. at 138 (holding that the
LMRA "does not apply to a controversy involving damages resulting from the picketing
of a foreign ship operated entirely by foreign seamen under foreign articles while the
vessel is temporarily in an American port").
137 See Labor Union of Pico, 968 F.2d at 192. Plaintiffs were South Korean
citizens and members of a duly formed South Korean labor union which represented the
employees of Pico Korea, Ltd. (Pico), a South Korean corporation. See id. at 192. Pico
was wholly owned by a Delaware corporation, which, in turn, was wholly owned by a
New York corporation. See id. Plaintiffs represented Pico's employees in signing a
collective bargaining agreement with Pico. See id. When business at Pico took a
downturn, management in the United States decided to stop supplying additional
working capital to the subsidiary. See id. at 193 (finding that Pico's problems included
"increasing labor costs, low productivity and lack of operating capital"). Thereafter,
Pico went out of business, and plaintiffs brought suit against the American subsidiary
and its parent corporation, asserting that Pico's shutdown violated provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement. See id.
See id. at 194.
Id.
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The plaintiffs' second argument, that the work the employees
performed fell within the statute's description of commerce, 141 was
similarly rejected by the court as it deferred to precedent.' 44
Hence, despite a recognition by the court that the global economy
presented an increasing likelihood that commerce between a
foreign country and a state may be affected by "foreign
industry,"' 145  the plaintiffs were unable to overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality. Here, the Second Circuit
used extraterritoriality to deny jurisdiction over a non-citizen's
claim against a U.S. citizen.'4" The merits of the claim were left
unaddressed, and the plaintiffs returned home without a remedy. 1
47
4. Fair Labor Standards Act" 8
Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc.149 represents a fourth
example of the refusal of U.S. courts to apply domestic labor laws
143 See id. Plaintiffs contended that "commerce," for the purposes of the LMRA,
should include trade "between any foreign country and any State." Id. (citation
omitted).
144 See id. (citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949)
(holding that the "Eight Hour Law" did not apply to contracts performed in foreign
countries) and Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 142-44 (1957)
(holding that the LMRA did not apply to stop picketing of a foreign flagged ship
operated by foreign seamen when that ship was temporarily docked in an American port,
and noting that the LMRA "is concerned with industrial strife between American
employers and employees")).
145 See Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Products, Inc., 968 F.2d 191, 195
(2d Cir. 1992).
See id.
147 See generally id. (concluding that the LMRA did not apply to non-citizens, and,
therefore, never reaching the issue of whether the plaintiffs had a valid claim under the
Act). The Second Circuit was concerned that reaching the merits as to liability of the
American parent for its South Korean subsidiary would conflict with the general rule
that "the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law
of the country where the act is done." Id. (quoting New York Cent. R.R. v. Chisholm,
268 U.S. 29, 31 (1925) (quoting American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.
347, 357 (1909)).
148 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988). The FLSA sets minimum standards for working
conditions to protect the health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers, id. § 202,
including minimum wage, id. § 206, maximum hours, id. § 207, and child labor laws, id.
§ 212.
149 932 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Bums v. Metcalfe Constr. Co., 69 F.
Supp. 381, 381-82 (W.D. Mo. 1946) (holding that employers "engaged in the
construction of highways and air transport facilities" in Canada are not covered by the
FLSA, and finding that an American employee whose employment was entirely in
Canada was not "in commerce" for the purposes of the Act).
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extraterritorially. In Cruz, the Third Circuit considered the
extraterritorial application of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).15° The court held that the plaintiffs, foreign seamen
employed by an American corporation, had to meet a dual test in
order for the FLSA to apply: (1) the employees had to be seamen
employed on a U.S. vessel"' and (2) the employer had to meet the
150 The controversy resolved by the court in Cruz arose during the Iran-Iraq war.
See Cruz, 932 F.2d at 220. The Kuwaiti government asked the United States to reflag
eleven Kuwaiti vessels as U.S. ships in order to shield them from danger as they
followed their Persian Gulf routes. See id. The United States agreed to the reflagging.
See id. However, before the ships were allowed to reflag, the ships were required to
make certain changes in accordance with U.S. law. See id.
The first requirement was that the ships be transferred to American ownership.
See id. The court held the following:
Congress required that American-flag vessels be owned by an entity such as a
corporation established under the laws of the United States or of a State, whose
president or other chief executive officer and chairman of its board of directors
are citizens of the United States and no more of its directors are non-citizens
than a minority of the number necessary to constitute a quorum.
Id. (citations omitted). Thus, Chesapeake Shipping, Inc. (Chesapeake) was chartered
under Delaware law as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Kuwaiti ship owner
specifically for this purpose. See id. The ships were then transferred to Chesapeake.
See id. at 222.
Second, the vessels had to comply with certain safety regulations. See id. The
Coast Guard granted a grace period to Chesapeake, thereby allowing it to gradually
bring the vessels into compliance with the safety regulations. See id. (noting that the
grace period was one-year for some regulations and two-years for other regulations).
Finally, the vessels had to comply with certain manning requirements. See id. at
220. For example, the ships' masters and radio officers were required to be U.S.
citizens. See id. Nevertheless, the Filipino crews were allowed to remain on board the
several ships, because the ships fell under the foreign-to-foreign exception to U.S.
maritime law, which exempts vessels making no calls in U.S. ports from the limitation
of alien seamen to just twenty-five percent of the crew. See id. at 220-21.
After the reflagging, Chesapeake time-chartered the ships back to their former
Kuwaiti owner, see id. at 222, and the ships continued their Persian Gulf routes
uninterrupted, see id. at 223. The ships carried cargo from the Persian Gulf to ports in
Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Far East. See id. Neither the ships nor their crews
ever called in a U.S. port. See id. However, the shipment of cargo from one of the
reflagged vessels was subsequently transshipped from the foreign port in which the
vessel called to American customers in the United States. See id.
Two years later, the Kuwaiti parent repurchased six of eleven vessels, and the
Filipino crews on the remaining five ships were dismissed and replaced with American
crews. See id. Subsequently, 228 crew members filed suit against the subsidiary and its
Kuwaiti parent corporation, see id. at 222, claiming that the American reflagging had
"entitled them to minimum wages and benefits under FLSA," id. at 220 (describing the
law suit filed by the crew members against five corporate defendants, only two of which
bear upon the discussion of these labor issues).
151 See id. at 224. This fact was fairly easy to establish, given that Kuwait and the
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"in commerce" requirement of the FLSA.'52
The second prong of the test proved impossible to establish.'53
Remarking that the "FLSA uses the term ['in commerce'] more
narrowly than other statutes,' ' 4 the court of appeals asserted that
the Act's language and legislative history revealed that Congress'
intent was to protect workers in the domestic economy only."5
Thus, the Cruz court concluded that the FLSA was not designed to
cover "foreign seamen employed on vessels engaged in foreign
operations entirely outside of the United States, its waters and
territories.' 56  In short, the court held that American employers
were acting "outside commerce;" thus, the foreign employees were
once again unable to overcome the strong presumption against
extraterritorial application of U.S. law.'57
C. Linking Labor Concerns to Trade
Although labor issues are currently a matter of domestic law,'58
free trade is changing the impact of labor-management relations.
The fundamental conflict seems to spring from the fact that the
United States specifically agreed to reflag the vessels as American ships to protect them.
See id. at 225.
152 See id.
153 See id. at 228 ("The transfer of ownership of the vessels to a United States
corporation, Chesapeake, did not convert this shipping enterprise into one engaged in
commerce within the terms of FLSA.").
Id. ("Congress, by excluding from the Act's coverage employees whose
activities merely 'affect commerce,' indicated its intent not to make the scope of the Act
coextensive with its power to regulate commerce." (quoting Mitchell v. Lublin,
McGraughy & Assocs., 358 U.S. 207, 211 (1959))).
155 See Cruz, 932 F.2d at 226. But see Cruz, 932 F.2d 218 at 233 (3d Cir. 1991)
(Alito, J. dissenting). Circuit Judge Alito's dissent states that, while the statutory
language of FLSA is ambiguous, the legislative history makes plain that
"Congress... intended for the FLSA's minimum wage provision to apply to all seamen
on all American flag ships." Id. at 218 (3d Cir. 1991) (Alito, J. dissenting) (emphasis
added). Compare Judge Alito's dissent to Judge Cowen's concurrence, in which Judge
Cowen begs the statutory interpretation question altogether by framing the issue as
choice of laws. See id. at 233 (3d Cir. 1991) (Cowen, J. concurring).
156 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 232 (3d Cir. 1991).
157 See id. at 231. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted Congress'
"explicit exclusion of ships flying foreign flags" as an attempt to "avoid interference in
the delicate field of international relations by imposing domestic labor law on foreign
ships employing foreign nationals at foreign wages." Id.
158 See supra notes 101-57 and accompanying text for a survey of case law.
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world economy has evolved into an interdependent system'59 and,
as such, has moved beyond the current ability of sovereign states
to govern internationally. 6 While the global economy may
function more or less cooperatively, the rigidity of the separate
sovereign states makes labor protection on. an international scale
problematic.'61
Nevertheless, with the success of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 162 and the its evolution into the World
Trade Organization (WTO),'63 the proliferation of free trade is
inevitable. Free trade areas are being established all over the
world, from the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) in Asia, to the European Union in Western Europe, to
the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) in Latin America. 64
There are even talks about a hemispheric free trade area (FTA) for
159 See RONALD G. EHRENBERG, LABOR MARKETS AND INTEGRATING NATIONAL
ECONOMIES 1 (1994) [hereinafter EHRENBERG].
160 Id. at xviii ("Cross-border economic integration and national political
sovereignty have increasingly come into conflict, leading to a growing mismatch
between the economic and political structures of the world. The effective domains of
economic markets have come to coincide less and less with national governmental
jurisdictions.").
161 Id. at xix. "Deeper integration [among sovereign states] requires analysis of
virtually all [domestic] policies and practices .... Future debates about behind-the-
border policies will occur with increasing frequency and prove at least as complex and
contentious as the past negotiations regarding at- the-border restrictions." Id. Tensions
surrounding the political and economic integration of sovereign nations are centered
around "three broad sources: cross-border spillovers, diminished national autonomy,
and challenges to political sovereignty." Id.
162 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature, Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, reprinted as amended in 4 Basic Instruments &
Selected Documents [B.I.S.D.] (1969).
163
See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 70, at 1; see also Marakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Part II, Apr. 14, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144
(1994). The WTO, an international organization established in 1995, acts as an
administrator of a variety of multilateral trade agreements, including GATT, entered into
by its member nations. See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 70, at 1. "The WTO
itself does not embody substantive rules regarding government policies-it is simply a
formal institutional structure under whose auspices Members negotiate and implement
trade agreements." Id. As of 1995, a total of 128 nations were members the WTO's
oversight. See id. "The basic underlying philosophy of the WTO is that open markets,
nondiscrimination, and global competition in international trade are conducive to the
national welfare of all countries." Id.
164 After Free Trade Euphoria, Now Comes the Hard Part, 12 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 3, at 131 (Jan. 18, 1995) [hereinafter After Free Trade Euphoria].
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the entire Western Hemisphere. 61 Closer to home, the United
States and Canada recently included Mexico in the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1 66 In 1995, the United
States, Canada, and Mexico began negotiations with Chile to
expand NAFTA again.1
67
Many world leaders are now turning their attention to the
impact of global free trade on labor. While one cannot stop a
flood with a feather, the waters can certainly be channeled to
productive purpose. 68  In March 1995, European Union Social
Affairs Ministers issued a memorandum calling for the linking of
FTAs to labor agreements designed to promote international labor
standards, including cooperation between the WTO and the
International Labor Organization (ILO) 69 That same month, the
Director General of the ILO urged the WTO to require its
membership to adopt certain ILO conventions. 7 ' Meanwhile, with
its 1993 success in negotiating an agreement on labor conditions,
165 See id. The Western Hemisphere presently "boasts over 20 diverse trade
arrangements," and 34 leaders at the Miami Summit of the Americas, held in December
1994, adopted "an ambitious timetable for moving to hemispheric free trade, calling for
the conclusion of negotiations for a [hemispheric FTA] by 2005." Id.
166 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32
I.L.M. 289 (containing chapters one to nine of the agreement entered by and among the
United States, Mexico, and Canada); North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,
1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605 (containing chapters ten to twenty-two of the
agreement entered by and among the United States, Mexico, and Canada).
167 See After Free Trade Euphoria, supra note 164, at 131. The talks regarding
Chile have stalled while the American Congress decides the issue of extending or
reauthorizing the President's fast track negotiating authority. See Key Staffer Sees Fast-
Track Extension in 1997 Regardless of Who Wins Election, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 17, at 705 (May 1, 1996) [hereinafter Key Staffer]. For a discussion of fast track,
see infra notes 306-26 and accompanying text.
168 Specifically, while protectionist legislation may seem like an attractive solution
to the labor concerns that accompany economic globalization, in the long run it may
actually hurt labor; international trade is a necessity, as well as a reality, now. See, e.g.,
CRAVER, supra note 1, at 119 (suggesting that "[i]ntemational trade conflicts among
historically interdependent nations could easily precipitate a nationalistic world
environment that would culminate in a Pyrrhic victory for organized labor").
169 See EU Officials, Approve Linking of Labor Standards, Trade Accords, 12 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 590 (Mar. 29, 1995) [hereinafter EU Officials] (quoting
French Labor Minister Michel Giraud as saying, "[T]ogether with the United States and
Canada, [the European Union] feel[s] this issue has grown in stature and is now
accepted"). See infra notes 187-343 and accompanying text for a description of the role
the International Labor Organization and other international organizations have played
in the development and promotion of international labor standards.
170 See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 70, at 263.
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the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, as a
supplement to NAFTA, 7' the Clinton administration turned its
attention to renewing efforts to extend fast track negotiating
authority for future FTA negotiations.17 At issue, specifically, was
the President's ability to link social issues such as labor and
environmental concerns to trade agreements.
1 3
As developed nations become more concerned, however, that
free trade--while strengthening their economies-will work to the
disadvantage of their labor forces and, subsequently, they will seek
to curb such mixed effects. 4 As such developing economies are
beginning to voice strong objections to the imposition of Western
labor standards.'75  The leaders of developing nations are
171 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC].
172 Fast track authority streamlines trade negotiations by enabling the President to
negotiate agreements and then submit them to Congress. Congress, in considering the
agreements, is limited to either approval or disapproval without an opportunity to
amend. See infra notes 306-26 and accompanying text for a further description of fast
track, its function, and issues surrounding its renewal. See generally Negotiations on
Fast Track Break Down After Progress Reported, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at
1717 (Oct. 18, 1995) (quoting a letter to House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) that
describes fast track as a "formal transfer of the constitutional responsibility to lay duties
and regulate foreign commerce from the Congress to the Executive").
173 See President Issues Trade Policy Agenda for 1995, Report on Progress Last
Year, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 513 (March 15, 1995) (characterizing labor
concerns as "trade-distorting" practices which result in unfair global competition). U.S.
Trade Representative Mickey Kantor and the Clinton administration faced tough
opposition to the renewal of fast track negotiating authority in the Republican Congress.
See Gephardt, supra note 54, at 858. The Republican leader of the House of
Representatives, Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), said, "If fast track becomes a magnet
for unrelated provisions, the integrity of the legislative process could be threatened and
support for a coordinated policy and procedure for approving trade agreements could be
seriously eroded." See id. See also Crane Wants Early Vote Next Year on Chile's
Accession to NAFTA, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 898 (May 24, 1995)
[hereinafter Crane] (describing the partisan split between Democrats, who support the
addition of social issues of labor to trade agreements, and Republicans, who insist that
such issues should not be included in trade negotiations). Eventually, the "fast-track
extension was derailed in 1995 after the Clinton administration and the GOP majority
were unable to bridge differences on labor and environment issues." Key Staffer supra
note 167, at 705. Then-Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole (R-Kan.) "called for a
cooling off period in future trade negotiations.., and subsequently rejected a
compromise GOP proposal for Chile-only fast track." Id.
174 See, e.g., EU Trade Commissioner Outlines Objectives for Post-Uruguay Round
ERA, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1751 (Oct. 25, 1995) [hereinafter EU Trade];
Perez-Lopez, supra note 7, at 253 (describing various ways in which the United States
has linked these two issues through past legislation).
175 See, e.g., Striking a Balance, supra note 16, at 40; Costa Rica Concerned About
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concerned that forcing them to uphold Western labor standards
may keep them from ever progressing to the point of being able to
afford such standards.'76 Hence, the premature imposition of such
terms could have detrimental effects on developing nations, and,
as Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad stated, "[w]hen a
worker is jobless, the right to strike is meaningless."'77 The leaders
of developing nations are therefore concerned that, along with
labor standards, Western industrial nations may export cultural
values to their countries.
78
Despite the multiplicity of interests involved in linking
international trade and labor standards, some kind of compromise
must be achieved to keep the global economy in a state of
equilibrium.'79 A recent study conducted by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 8' found that
certain international labor standards are "essential immediately for
assuring fundamental human rights,'' while others are "desirable
Links Between Trade and Labor, Environment, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at
1225 (July 19, 1995) [hereinafter Costa Rica].
176 7 See Striking a Balance, supra note 16, at 40.
177 Id.; see also HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 70, at 264. Hoekman and
Kostecki described the effects of prematurely imposing Western standards on
developing nations as follows:
Trade policies raise the prices of foreign products, thus imposing a welfare cost
at home, while at the same time probably worsening the labour situation in the
exporting country. For example, imposing a relatively high minimum wage in
a developing country with low per capita income will be to a high tax on
employment of low.-skilled workers. Unemployment will rise, and given the
absence or weakness of social safety-nets (unemployment insurance), can, be
expected to have a very detrimental impact on poverty. It should come as no
surprise, therefore, that developing countries oppose any attempt to link market
access to labour standards.
Id. at 264-65.
See Costa Rica, supra note 175, at 1225.
179 "[T]he political process may allow the benefits from increased trade.., mobility
to be fully achieved only if nations systematically develop methods to have some of
their labor market policies converge." See EHRENBERG, supra note 159, at 3.
180 See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Trade and
Labour Standards: A Review of the Issues 2 (1995) [hereinafter OECD]. Founded in
1960 as part of an international convention, the OECD was created to promote the
development of the world economy, including contributions to stable economic
expansion in developing economies, and to facilitate the expansion of world trade. See
id. Its membership includes Canada, Mexico, and the United States. See id.
181 See Some Labor Standards are Essential Immediately, 12 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 23, at 1003 (June 7, 1995) [hereinafter Some Labor Standards].
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targets to be set once countries can afford them."'' s A 1984 report
issued by the Netherlands National Advisory Council for
Development Cooperation also acknowledged the need to promote
international labor standards.'83
On the other hand, some commentators urge that it "makes
absolutely no sense" to condition globalization of trade on
"convergence of labour costs" across national borders, calling this
"blatant protectionism."'8 4  However, even these commentators
recognize that "it may prove feasible to achieve agreement that all
countries adopt minimum standards that are akin to basic human
rights."'185
U.S. labor law is firmly anchored within the borders of the
United States and its territories." 6 Yet, as the world economy
becomes increasingly interdependent, governments must begin to
reexamine the domestic nature of labor law within the context of
global free trade.
IV. Toward a Solution
Linking international trade with international labor standards is
hardly a new proposition.8 From the earliest American attempt to
link the two in 189088 to the implementation of the NAALC in
182 Id
183 See Hans J. Teunissen, Current Development: Recommendation on Minimum
International Standards, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 385 (1986) [hereinafter Teunissen]. The
report identified seven international standards (taken from the International Labor
Organization Conventions (ILOC)) as follows: (1) freedom of association (ILOC No.
87), (2) the right to engage in collective bargaining (ILOC No. 98), (3) equal
remuneration (ILOC No. 100), (4) abolition of forced labor (ILOC No. 105), (5)
prohibition of discrimination (ILOC No. 111), (6) full employment policy (ILOC No.
122), and (7) minimum age (ILOC No. 138). See id. at 385-86. However, the report left
open the question of whether adding labor issues to trade agreements is beneficial to
world trade. See id.
184 See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 70, at 264.
185 Id. at 265.
186 See supra notes 99-185 and accompanying text for a survey of case law
illustrating the resistance of American courts to apply jurisdiction outside the borders of
the United States.
187 See generally Perez-Lopez, supra note 7, at 254 (asserting that the United States
has linked international trade with labor conditions for almost a century); HOEKMAN &
KOSTECKI, supra note 70, at 262 ("Discussions relating to workers' rights and trade have
a long history... going back at least 150 years.").
188 See Perez-Lopez, supra note 7, at 254.
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1993, the United States government has characterized this effort as
an attempt to protect international commerce from unfair
competition and trade-distorting practices. 9 In recent years, the
issue has become a partisan one, with Democrats and Republicans
split as to whether to encumber free trade with social concerns.190
Free trade, however, is not necessarily antithetical to the
maintenance of international labor standards.91
A. The International Labor Organization and the Effort to
Establish International Standards
Attempts to establish international labor standards date back to
the early part of the twentieth century." Over the course of the
past ninety years, several international organizations have been
founded to address the special needs of workers around the globe,
including the ILO and the OECD. The ILO, which is perhaps the
most notable of these organizations, was founded as part of the
Treaty of Versailles in 1919'93 with the mission of promoting
social justice and lasting peace through encouraging basic labor
189 See Administration to Introduce Fast Track By Early June, Kantor Tells
Congress, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 646 (April 12, 1995) [hereinafter
Administration] (reporting that U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, in urging
congressional reapproval of fast track authority, characterized the ability to link trade
and labor not "as an ideological matter [but]... as a business matter of unfair
comparative advantage").
190 See Crane, supra note 173, at 898 (noting that Democrats favor linking trade
with social concerns and that Republicans are opposed to encumbering trade in this
manner).
191 See OECD, supra note 180, at 19-21. See infra notes 250-343 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the NAALC and its attempt to link free trade with
labor standards.
192 See Steve Charnovitz, Fair Labor Standards and International Trade, 20 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 61, 62 (1986) [hereinafter Charnovitz] (tracing the history of
international labor standards back to "the international labor conference in Bern of 1906,
which adopted a treaty to prohibit the manufacture, import, or sale of matches
containing white phosphorous").
193 See PETER I. HAJNAL, GUIDE TO UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION,
DOCUMENTATION, AND PUBLISHING FOR STUDENTS, RESEARCHERS, LIBRARIANS 422
(1978) [hereinafter HAJNAL]. Originally, the ILO was affiliated with the League of
Nations. See Charnovitz, supra note 192, at 63. However, in 1946, the ILO became the
"first specialized Agency associated with the [United Nations." See GIUSEPPE
SCHIAVONE, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A DIRECTORY AND DICTIONARY 149, 149
(1993) [hereinafter SCHIAVONE]. "The ILO is a unique body, in so far as it is tripartite--
bringing together employers, labour unions, and governments." HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI,
supra note 70, at 263.
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standards among its member nations. 94 To accomplish its mission,
the ILO developed 171 conventions, 195 representing minimum
labor standards on a variety of topics. 96 Among these conventions
are those that seek to regulate "the hours of work,... the
provision of a living wage, the protection of... worker[s] against
sickness, disease, and injury arising out of [their] employment, the
protection of children,... [and] the recognition of... the freedom
of association... ."'9' While the success of the ILO's efforts may
be questioned,19" the influence of the ILO over internationalization
of labor standards is undeniable. 99
Despite the efforts of the ILO and similar organizations, the
concept of international labor standards is still a controversial
one. Some argue that so-called "international" labor standards
194 See HAiNAL, supra note 193, at 422; see also SCHIAVONE, supra note 193, at
149. Originally, the ILO had only forty-five member nations, but that number has
grown to more than 150 members. See id. at 149. The membership includes the United
States, Canada, Mexico, and Chile. See HAJNAL, supra note 193, at 423.
195 See SCHIAVONE, supra note 193, at 150. ILO members are required to submit
these conventions to their national legislatures for ratification. See id. Members are
required to report back to the ILO as to the successes of ratification and implementation.
See id. If a member does not ratify a particular convention, the member must report this
fact as well as a statement of "the difficulties preventing or delaying ratification." Id.
Despite this requirement, member nations seem to be given a great deal of discretion
regarding whether to ratify the conventions. See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 70,
at 263. For instance, the United States, which is an ILO member nation, "had accepted
less than two dozen ILO conventions as of 1994." Id.
196 See SCHIAVONE, supra note 193, at 150.
197 Id.
198 See id. at 151 (noting that "[tihe activities of the [ILO] have met with many
serious difficulties").
199 See, e.g., supra note 180-82 and accompanying text. For example, the OECD
has used the ILO's conventions as the basis for a recent study exploring the linking of
trade and labor standards. See infra notes 212-36 and accompanying text for an
overview of the OECD study and its suggestions for internationalization of minimum
labor standards.
200 One should exercise caution not to overlook the conflicting interests among the
various sides in an attempt to winnow down the debate to manageable black-and-white
issues. There are more than two sides to the debate and no simple path to separate right
from wrong. Hence, any possible solution must bear in mind the multiplicity of
viewpoints involved-American labor, foreign labor, foreign governments, the
American government, and American MNCs--and strive to come to some general
consensus addressing the needs of all concerned.
One commentator has described the conflict involved in implementing
international labor standards in the following manner:
Constructing any definition of [international labor standards] must proceed
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are actually Western labor standards and that imposing these
standards on developing nations is both unrealistic0 ' and
unwarranted protectionism.2 2  In contrast, at least one
commentator claims that the development of basic "international"
labor standards is an issue of vital human rights.2"3
B. The Growing Discussion of International Labor Standards
Despite the clash of ideals and interests, there is a growing
discussion of the need for implementing certain basic global
standards, with an eye toward balancing human rights with the
economic realities of developing economies.2 4 This discussion is
from a foundation of moral, political, and economic values. Since the nations
of the world do not share a common set of values, there cannot be one set of
standards that would be acceptable to every party. Nevertheless, it may be
possible for the democratic nations to agree to a definition of fairness based on
the following two principles. First, the labor market should operate under
voluntary choice, not coercion. Second, there should be a floor for workplace
conditions below which no nation can go.
Charnovitz, supra note 192, at 69; see also EHRENBERG, supra note 159, at 92-99
(suggesting international convergence of labor policies as a necessity to overcome the
dangers to labor posed by the global market).
201 See, e.g., Striking a Balance, supra note 16, at 40. Governmental officials in
many developing nations urge that proposed international labor standards are too rigid
and "[b]ased mainly on western European standards." Id. at 41. These nations are most
concerned with developing their economies by drawing MNC investment while letting
labor standards grow out of the resulting economic stability and a more natural
progression. Id; see also OECD, supra note 180 (asserting that some labor standards
should be goals for the future, to be obtained as developing nations can afford them).
202 See, e.g., Striking a Balance, supra note 16, at 40. The chairperson of the ILO
governing board has warned of "a new protectionism" evidenced by "threats to block
exports on claims of poor treatment of workers." Id. at 41. Implementation of these
kinds of trade sanctions, she postulates, could be counterproductive, since "the more you
penalize a country [with sanctions], the less able it will be to meet the norm." Id. at 44;
see also OECD, supra note 180, at 14 (noting that "[p]eople in the developing world are
offended when they are treated as being incapable of deciding what would be
appropriate for themselves, and they rightly regard developed countries' advice as
patronizing"); Charnovitz, supra note 192, at 68 ("The question of what constitutes
'unfair' working conditions presents a thorny problem of definition .... [One approach]
is to define as unfair those workplace conditions which, in some way, 'exploit' workers.
Aside from resting on tautology, such a definition raises the difficulty of trying to
second-guess what may be a voluntary labor market transaction.").
203 See Collingsworth, supra note 2, at 55 ("When the labor conditions in most
developing countries are considered... it is not unreasonable to expect that American
policy would reflect the importance of these humanitarian concerns.").
204 See, e.g., Some Labor Standards, supra note 181, at 1003; EU Officials, supra
note 169, at 590. See generally Perez-Lopez, supra note 7; International Labour Office,
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 1919-1991 (1992)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS] (compiling almost a century of
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often framed in terms of implementing labor rights as part of trade
agreements. °5 While free trade and improved labor standards are
not mutually exclusive,2 6 economic data suggest that pushing trade
sanctions as a response to labor violations may have mixed effects
on the cause of international workers' rights.2 7. One study has
suggested that basic labor standards should be encouraged through
international agreements without the threat of trade sanctions.2°t
Moreover, this study indicates that developing nations should be
permitted to rely on market forces to pull up labor standards as
their economies grow, as opposed to regulating those standards
before a nation's economy is stable enough to support improved
labor standards.2"9
C. International Labor Standards: What Every Worker Should
Know
In a recent study,"0  the OECD suggested that collective
bargaining, freedom of association, minimum working conditions
(health and safety), minimum age limitations (abolition of child
"discussions" among member nations on the issue of International Labor Standards).
205 See, e.g., OECD, supra note 180, at 9; U.S. to Make 'Less Noise' About Linking
Trade to Labor, Environment, Frost Says, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 334 (Feb.
22, 1995) (quoting Ellen Frost, counselor to U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor,
as saying that "the [Clinton] administration sees the need to... be able to link trade
policy to the protection of workers' rights around the world").
206 See OECD, supra note 180, at 21. "The [experience of] East Asian
economies.., shows that growth of trade and improvements in labour standards can go
together .... [However, granting p]rimacy to labour standards [over trade initiatives], if
premature, can preclude competitiveness in trade, which in turn affects labour in
[developing] countries adversely." Id.
207 See id. at 14-15 (suggesting that labor standards should be left to individual
countries in order to avoid, among other things, cultural imperialism, protectionism, and
the difficulty of determining an adequate enforcement mechanism). "[T]he ILO itself
has opposed sanctions against countries that have failed to comply with conventions
they have ratified or with the ILO's universal principles... [because] the mere prospect
of sanctions is capable of discouraging ratification." Id. at 15; see also CRAVER, supra
note 1, at 119.
208 See OECD, supra note 180, at 22.
209 See id. at 17-19. The OECD has documented that, in economies which allow
the market forces to operate unencumbered by premature labor regulation, "[p]eople at
the bottom end of the income distribution have benefited proportionately from economic
growth, and in this way, growth raised labor standards: real minimum wages were
increased, unemployment insurance systems were instituted, social protection, systems
were created, and collective bargaining grew in importance." Id. at 17.
210 See OECD, supra note 180.'
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labor), and freedom from slavery and indentured servitude are
"essential immediately for assuring fundamental human rights."'2"
The OECD contends these are the minimum labor standards which
nations should incorporate in international trade agreements in
order to ensure that labor forces throughout the world do not
disproportionately bear the costs of the global market."' The
following subsections illustrate more fully the basic labor
standards suggested by the OECD for immediate incorporation
and implementation.
1. Collective Bargaining and the Freedom of Association
The first of these basic rights is collective bargaining and the
freedom of association."3 Although collective bargaining could be
considered a separate right from the freedom of association, in
actuality, the two support one another. For example, the right to
211 See OECD, supra note 180, at 13. The OECD's suggestions do not necessarily
represent any kind of international consensus as to what standards should be prioritized
and implemented. For instance, the ILO, itself, has more than 170 conventions on
different labor standards. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS, supra note 204.
Interestingly, the definition of necessary rights set forth in the study by the OECD
closely tracks the language of those minimum standards established throughout the
twentieth century by the ILO. See id.
Other proposals put forth different standards in different combinations. See.
e.g., Teunissen, supra note 183, at 385-86 (detailing a report issued by the Netherlands
National Advisory Council for Development Cooperation); Collingsworth, supra note 2,
at 58-67 (describing common labor abuses in developing economies and arguing that
they should be curtailed); OECD, supra note 180, at 11-12 (outlining the proposals of
both the U.S. Labor Department and the European Union). The OECD study contends
that many of the proposals are little more than wish lists. See OECD, supra note 180, at
12. However, the OECD study does include four of the most commonly advanced
workers' rights, and so, for the purpose of this Comment, it should represent a floor and
not necessarily a ceiling to the discussion.
212 See generally EHRENBERG, supra note 159 (suggesting that national policies on
such domestic issues as labor standards must begin to converge if the globalization of
the world's economy is to succeed). But see OECD, supra note 180, at 20-21 (warning
that minimum labor standards implemented through trade agreements must be
implemented carefully).
The suggestions for linking trade agreements with international labor standards
set forth by this Comment must be tempered with a great deal of caution. Without
caution, the road to free trade and fair international labor standards can be full of
potholes. For instance, the "[p]rimacy to labour standards [in developing countries], if
premature, can preclude competitiveness in trade, which in turn affects labour in those
countries adversely." Id. at 21. Nevertheless, certain rights are basic to all workers
because "production would not be allowed unless they are satisfied. International
agreement should be sought on these basic workplace rights." Id.
213 See OECD, supra note 180, at 23-24.
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form a trade union would be of little use if that trade union were
deprived of its collective voice in bargaining with management for
better working conditions. Freedom of association really serves as
a foundation upon which other rights are built; without this
freedom, employees would be "unable to influence the terms of
their employment, and employers [would] be able to impose
arbitrary conditions ' 4 upon their employees. The freedom to
associate ensures workers the right to form their own groups
separate from government intervention and influence, to elect their
own representatives, and to protect themselves against dissolution
by governmental agencies."' Building upon this freedom,
collective bargaining enables workers to negotiate with employers
to establish employment terms provides workers a means for
resolving disputes with employers." 6 In addition, this right
includes protection against government interference and anti-union
discrimination in its various forms: "refusal of employment,
dismissal, or prejudice. 2 7  Thus, collective bargaining and
freedom of association provide an important cornerstone for the
basic rights of workers." 8 It follows, therefore, that including
them in international trade agreements may assist in improving
conditions for workers on an international scale.
214 CRAVER, supra note 1, at 8 (arguing that unionization is actually a benefit to
employees, employers, and society as a whole).
215 See OECD, supra note 180, at 23; see also Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 435-37 (1992) [hereinafter Freedom of
Association Convention]. The ILO's Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organise Convention, 1948, which-like all ILO conventions--applies only to
member nations of the ILO who have ratified the convention, provides that some
exceptions in the right of employees to organize may be made for members of the armed
forces and police officers. See id. at 436. Otherwise, the 1948 Convention states that
the law of the land may not be written or applied so as to impair the freedom of
association. See id. In essence, the 1948 Convention suggests that labor unions, which
abide by the laws of a nation, are permissible in all nations that agreed to the
convention. See id.
216 See OECD, supra note 180, at 24. See also Right to Organise and Collective
Bargaining Convention, 1949, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 524-25 (1992) [hereinafter Collective Bargaining Convention].
217 See OECD, supra note 180, at 24; see also Collective Bargaining Convention,
supra note 216, at 524. The ILO's Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining
Convention, 1949, also prevents acts of interference such as the domination of trade
organizations by employers through offers of financial support. See id. at 524-25.
218 See generally CRAVER, supra note 1.
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2. Working Conditions
A second category of rights that should be promoted through
international trade agreements are those affecting working
conditions."9 Although at least one commentator would prioritize
working conditions such as minimum wages and hours,220 the
OECD study suggests that the first concern should be requiring
employers to inform workers of all attendant health risk and safety
concerns in the workplace, thereby enabling them to make
informed choices.22 ' As an economy expands and becomes better
able to support additional labor standards, the working conditions
standard should
provide for the establishment and maintenance... of minimum,
working standards: wages that provide a decent living for workers and
their families; working hours that do not exceed forty-eight hours per
week, with a full twenty-four hour rest day; a specified annual paid
holiday; and minimum conditions for protection of the safety and
health of workers.1
22
Most developing nations, however, have not established
fundamental labor standards; thus, providing for some basic,
acceptable standards in trade agreements affords workers further
protection by decreasing incentives for the MNCs that deliberately
seek to exploit the lowest costs of production.
2 3
3. Child Labor
The third standard of fundamental importance establishes a
minimum age for employment, thus abolishing or limiting child
labor. 4 Child labor is a pervasive world problem. 5 In fact, the
219 See OECD, supra note 180, at 26-27.
220 See Collingsworth, supra note 2, at 64.
221 See OECD, supra note 180, at 31 n.14.
222 Id. at 26-27.
223 See supra notes 65-98 and accompanying text for a description of exploitative
MNC practices and its impact on labor, both in the United States and abroad.
224 See OECD, supra note 180, at 26.
225 See Joan M. Smith, North American Free Trade and the Exploitation of
Working Children, 4 TEMPLE POL. & CIV. RTs. L. REv. 57, 57 (1994) [hereinafter Smith]
("[O]ver 200 million child workers are exploited around the world.").
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problem affects even developed nations, such as the United States
and Canada. 26  International minimum age standards aim at
preventing children under the age of fifteen from working. 7
However, the minimum age could be flexible, as low as fourteen
for some developing nations,228 in order to prevent penalizing
families who depend on the labor of their children to help support
the entire family unit9 Inherent in the OECD concept of
minimum age is the need to provide compulsory education to all
children.23 In fact, because of the special needs of children in
achieving "[their] fullest physical and mental development, ' '23' the
abolition of child labor should be viewed as a priority. among the
list of international labor standards.
4. Freedom from Slavery and Indentured Servitude
The final basic protection for workers that the OECD considers
immediately necessary is the freedom from forced labor.232 Few
226 See id. at 58. Despite the presence of laws to prevent child labor, "enforcement
is weak and ineffective and the exploitation of child workers continues to flourish
throughout the United States, Canada, and Mexico." Id.
227
See OECD, supra note 180, at 26; see also Minimum Age Convention, 1973,
reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS 1030-40 (1992) [hereinafter Age
Convention]. Prior to 1973, the conventions of the ILO set minimum age for
employment by economic sector. See id. at 1030. However, the Minimum Age
Convention, 1973, consolidated the various conventions on minimum age "with a view
to achieving the total abolition of child labour." Id.
228 See OECD, supra note 180, at 26 ("... [A] Member whose economy and
educational facilities are insufficiently developed may, after consultation with the
organisations of employers and workers concerned, where such exist, initially specify a
minimum age of 14 years."); see also Age Convention, supra note 227, at 1031.
However, according to the ILO's convention a person must be at least 18 years old in
order to be employed in a job "which by its nature or the circumstances in which it is
carried out is likely to jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young persons." Id.
229 See OECD, supra note 180, at 72; see also Age Convention, supra note 227, at
1032 (excluding from the provisions of the minimum age convention "family and small-
scale holdings producing for local consumption and not regularly employing hired
workers").
230 See OECD, supra note 180, at 26; see also Age Convention, supra note 227, at
1031 (providing that the minimum age specified by the ILO's convention should not be
"less than the age of completion of compulsory schooling"). The ILO's convention on
minimum age for employment is designed to encourage member nations to
"progressively raise the minimum age ... to a level consistent with the fullest physical
and mental development of young persons." Id. at 1030.
231 Age Convention, supra note 227, at 1030.
232 See OECD, supra note 180, at 13, 25 ("Such labour rights are essential for
assuring fundamental human rights and ... should, therefore, be adopted around the
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would dispute the despicableness of slavery and indentured
servitude. In no other employment relationship is the worker more
completely bereft of any power to improve conditions, to make a
living wage (or any wage), or to achieve basic human dignity. The
United States has worked to end this practice throughout the world
since shortly after its own slavery trade was abolished, though
probably more for protectionist purposes than to accomplish any
strong moral cause.233 The OECD guidelines prohibit labor
"exacted from any person under the menace of penalty and for
which the person has not volunteered. 23 4  However, the OECD
guidelines would exempt certain forms of prison labor when
imposed as a penalty of having committed some antisocial or
violent crime.2" Because of the generally repugnant nature of this
particular labor abuse, its abolition through international trade
agreements may be the easiest for the international community to
achieve.236
D. Linking Trade to Labor Standards
1. Some Statutory Examples
Linking trade to international labor standards, as this Comment
suggests, is not a new idea in the United States. For example, the
U.S. Congress has included worker's rights in at least three trade
statutes237 within the last two decades.238 Although arguably these
world as soon as possible.").
233 See Perez-Lopez, supra note 7, at 254 (describing the Tariff Act of 1890 as an
act protecting U.S. workers from international competition that relied upon cheap
convict labor). However, one may question the extent to which the United States was
committed to the standard because a subsequent act lifted a ban on goods produced by
slavery or indentured servitude if there was a shortage of the particular good in the
United States. See id.
234 OECD, supra note 180, at 25; see also Freedom of Association Convention,
supra note 215, at 618-19 (prohibiting the use of forced or compulsory labor as a means
of political or ideological punishment, as punishment for labor or as a means of "racial,
social, national or religious discrimination").
235 See OECD, supra note 180, at 17, 25. Other exceptions include national service
obligations, emergency situations such as war or natural disaster, and minor community
services. See id. at 17.
236 See Charnovitz, supra note 192, at 69 ("The easiest cases to proscribe are
situations where workers are not permitted to make labor market choices freely.").
237 The statutes that we will briefly review are the Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act (CBERA), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (1994), the Guaranteed System of
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legislative acts do not go far enough toward the goal of
implementing international labor standards, they show the
beginnings of a federal policy to tie trade issues to worker's rights,
a position the Clinton administration is now promoting for
inclusion in the World Trade Organization's agenda.239
The first of these three statutes, the Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act (CBERA),2"4 provides for duty free imports to the
United States from qualifying nations in the Caribbean.24'
Included among the additional, non-mandatory criteria is a
provision for the President to consider the "degree to which
workers in the country are afforded reasonable workplace
conditions and have the right to organize and bargain
collectively.,
242
Like CBERA, the Guaranteed System of Preferences (GSP) 243
seeks to provide trade benefits to developing nations by allowing.
duty-free imports upon satisfaction of certain criteria.244 Under the
GSP, a country is eligible for duty-free imports unless it "has not
taken or is not taking steps to afford internationally recognized
worker rights to workers in the country. 245
Preferences (GSP), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1994), and the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC), 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1994).
238 See Perez-Lopez, supra note 7, at 259.
239 See Human Rights, Labor Issues and Trade Are Still Linked, U.S. Official Says,
12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.6, at 259 (Feb. 8, 1995). See also HOEKMAN &
KosTECKI, supra note 70, at 263 ("At the insistence of the USA and France, the issue of
labour standards was introduced in the final state of the Uruguay Round [of the
GATT].").
240 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (1994).
241 See Perez-Lopez, supra note 7, at 259. The nations must meet certain criteria in
order to qualify. See id.
242 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(8) (1994). "Absolute standards were not relied upon in
determining what constitutes 'reasonable workplace conditions' in a given country.
Instead.... the United States took into account ' ... the progress a country is making
toward better conditions."' Perez-Lopez, supra note 7, at 261-62. In determining which
nations qualify for CBERA benefits, the President examines the applicant's laws to
determine, among other things, whether the applicant recognizes freedom of association,
freedom to bargain collectively, and minimum workplace standards (freedom from
slavery, indentured servitude, and child labor). See id. at 262.
243 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1994).
244 See Perez-Lopez, supra note 7, at 266.
245 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(7) (1994). Workers' rights under this statute include the
freedom of association, the freedom to bargain collectively, the freedom from "forced or
compulsory labor," a minimum age for child laborers, and acceptable working
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Finally, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) 246
was established to encourage private capital investment in
developing nations.247 Investment is facilitated by granting special
insurance to qualified overseas investors for certain kinds of
investments and by helping to develop new investment projects.248
A nation participating in the OPIC program must take steps to
adopt and implement laws affording internationally recognized
worker rights to workers in that nation.249
2. Linking Free Trade and Labor: The Example of
NAALC
Perhaps the most striking example of a federal "policy trend"
toward linking trade and labor' standards is the NAALC" ° a
supplemental agreement to NAFTA.251 The NAALC marks the
first time in U.S. history that a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was
linked with labor concerns.252 This agreement represents an
attempt to balance the differing interests (of foreign and domestic
labor forces and governments of all countries).253. Some would
criticize the NAALC as going too far in incorporating social
concerns wholly irrelevant to trade,254 while others would claim it
conditions (minimum wages and hours, workplace safety, and health standards). See 19
U.S.C. § 2462(a)(4) (1994).
246 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1994).
247 See id.
248 See Perez-Lopez, supra note 7, at 274.
249 See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(a)(4) (1994). For purposes of OPIC, workers' rights are
the same as required under the GSP. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(7) (1994). See supra note
245 for a list of worker's rights under the GSP.
250
See NAALC, supra note 171, 32 I.L.M. 1499. However, this "policy," if it can
be called one, is far from settled. See infra notes 306-26 and accompanying text for a
review of the debate over the extension of fast track authority to labor issues.
251 In addition to the NAALC, the NAFTA also included a supplemental agreement
on the environment. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept.
14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480.
252 See C. O'Neal Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements:
Why the NAFTA Turned into a Battle, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 65 (1994)
[hereinafter Taylor] ("The supplemental agreements represent the first time that a U.S.
FTA has directly addressed [labor and environmental] issues and created supranational
bodies to monitor them.").
253 See supra notes 68-98 and accompanying text for an illustration of the
(sometimes) conflicting interests involved with implementing international labor
standards.
254 See, e.g., Gephardt, supra note 54, at 858 (stating that Republicans characterize
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does not go far enough to establish normative international
standards."' . However, when viewed as a starting point, the
NAALC becomes an interesting classroom example for furthering
the interests of worker's rights around the world while preserving
the domestic sovereignty of individual nations.256
a. The Drive Behind Negotiating a Separate
Agreement
Before the passage of NAFTA, debate over the involvement of
the United States and Canada in a FTA with Mexico was rife with
concerns as to the effect of lifting all barriers to trade, thereby
functioning not as a sovereign nation but as part of a regional
economic entity. 57 In, particular, these concerns focused on
Mexico and the effects on American labor of free trade with a
nation-with substantially lower wages.25 Although Mexico's labor
laws are actually more in line with international labor standards259
than U.S. labor laws, the concerns revolved around the Mexican
government's tendency toward lax enforcement of their laws.260
The Mexican. informal sector, which employs a significant
percentage of Mexican. workers and is not regulated by any labor
FTA side agreements on issues such as labor as "peripheral issues" and "unrelated
provisions" that "should be pursued in alternate negotiations, not tied to trade").
255 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 252, at 67 (noting that many labor groups would
have "preferred agreements giving greater control to the trinational commissions over
the content of domestic labor.., laws of each country").
256 See generally OECD, supra note 180, at 14-15 (outlining reasons for allowing
individual nations to set their own labor standards).
257 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 252, at 7 ("[FTAs] pose even more significant
consequences for the internal workings of a country than most trade agreements ....
Although the surrender and'the integration are partial rather than complete, the
arrangement still creates a significant impact in* the domestic sphere.").
258 See Katherine A. Hagen, Fundamentals of Labor Issues and NAFTA, 27 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 917, 919 (1994)'[hereinafter Hagen] (reporting on the concern expressed
by some U.S. citizens that eliminating trade barriers with Mexico would result in job
losses in America). A comparison between the average manufacturing wages of
American and Mexican employees reveals a difference of $13.82 per hour, with
Americans receiving "almost seven times as much" (1992 figures) as their Mexican
counterparts. See id. at 920.
259 See supra notes 192-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
international labor standards promoted by the ILO.
260 See Hagen, supra note 258, at 921 ("[A]lthough Mexican labor law conforms
with international labor standards far more than either U.S. or Canadian labor law,
critics were quick to point out the inadequacies in the application of that law.").
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legislation, presented another concern to employees in the United
States. 61 In addition, opponents of NAFTA worried that, although
Mexican workers have the right to organize and collectively
bargain, many Mexican labor unions have a suspiciously close
relationship with the Mexican government, raising doubts as to the
actual independence of the unions as representatives of labor
concerns.2 62  Despite a bitter debate -in the U.S. Congress, the
NAALC eventually achieved approval. 63
b. How NAALC Supports Labor Interests
Implicit in the NAALC is the hope that the economic growth
fostered by NAFTA will result in higher labor. standards in
Mexico.264 However, the agreement is not aimed solely at Mexican
labor practices. 65 Instead, it is a trilateral agreement that attempts
to encourage each signatory nation to adhere to certain standards,
while protecting the sanctity of each nation's sovereignty within
the realm of its own domestic labor law. 266
i. The NAALC's Purpose
The agreement's preamble sets out the signatories' resolve to
"protect, enhance and enforce basic workers' rights. 267 TO further
this interest, one of the NAALC's objectives is the promotion of
certain labor standards "to the maximum extent possible.2 6' These
standards include: (1) the freedom of association, (2) the right to
bargain collectively, (3) the right to strike, (4) the prohibition of
forced labor, (5) labor protection for children, (6) minimum
employment standards (including minimum wages and overtime
261 See id. at 921 n.10.
262 See id. at 924.
263 See Taylor, supra note 252, at 10-11 (describing the bitter debate in the U.S.
Congress). Interestingly, as a candidate for the U.S. presidency in the 1992 election,
Bill Clinton vowed to champion the interests of labor and environmental groups in
pursuit of the NAFTA. See id. at 4.
264 See Hagen, supra note 258, at 923. Such standards may include higher wages,
better occupational safety and health, and stricter enforcement of child labor laws. See
id. at 924.
265 See NAALC, supra note 171, preamble, 32 I.L.M. at 1502.
266 See id. preamble, 32 I.L.M. at 1502-03.
267 Id. preamble, 32 I.L.M. at 1502.
268 Id. art. l(b), 32 I.L.M. at 1503 (emphasis added).
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pay), (7) elimination of employment discrimination, (8) equal pay
regardless of gender, (9) occupational safety and health, (10) some
kind of worker's compensation, and (11) protection of migrant
workers.269 This list is an ambitious one that leaves unanswered
the question of the priority of implementation. However, the
NAALC does not dictate labor standards to any of its participants.
Instead, it requires only that each participant enforce its own
laws. 7 Thus, labor standards promoted by the NAALC are only
suggestions, not mandatory minimums required for participation in
NAFTA 7' Accordingly, the objectives merely require nations to
promote the labor principles enumerated above; not to adopt these
principles. 7 '
ii. The NAALC's Enforcement Structure
The NAALC establishes the Commission for Labor
Cooperation (Commission), a body that is composed of the
Ministerial Council (Council) and the Secretariat.273 The Council
is made up of labor ministers from the three signatory nations of
NAFTA and serves two main functions. 4 First, the Council acts
as a general overseer of the implementation of the agreement by
managing details of its day-to-day functioning and by making
recommendations for improvement of the agreement. 75 Second,
the Council acts as a coordinator for cooperative actions. 76 In this
function, the Council facilitates, among other things, the free
exchange of labor, the collection of enforcement and standards
data through the promotion of joint research projects, and the
269 See id. annex 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1515-16.
270 See id. art. l(f), 32 I.L.M. at 1503.
271 See id. annex 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1515; see also Hagen, supra note 258, at 925 ("The
[labor] principles [outlined in Annex 1], then, are not even intended to create an
acknowledgment of common minimum standards .... [T]he enunciation of "guiding
principles" was deliberately kept separate from the identification of standards for
implementation in the agreement.")
272 See NAALC, supra note 171, art. 1(b), 32 I.L.M. at 1503.
273 See id. art. 8(2), 32 1.L.M. at 1504.
274 See id. art. 9, 32 I.L.M. at 1505.
275 See id. art. 10(1).
276 See id. art. 10(1)(c).
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organization of seminars. 7 These cooperative activities are to be
carried out "with due regard for the economic, social, cultural, and
legislative differences between [the signatory nations]."278 An
additional function of the Council is the selection of the
Secretariat.279
The Secretariat, which includes an executive director and a
staff of fifteen, reports directly to the Council, but remains
independent of any government.28 The Secretariat's main function
is to conduct regular reports on labor law, trends, strategies,
market conditions, and human resource development programs.2 8
In addition, the Secretariat prepares studies on various topics as
requested by the Council.2
In addition to the Commission, the NAALC provides for the
formation of a National Administration Office (NAO) in each of• .. 283
the signatory nations. A NAO serves as a "point of contact" or a
liaison between the government of a signatory nation, the Council,
and other NAOs.2 4 A NAO may be called upon to supply labor
related information to. support studies conducted by the Secretariat
or to facilitate a consultation in connection with a complaint
brought against a member nation. 5
iii. Dispute Resolution Under the NAALC
Where conflicts arise, one nation's NAO may request a
consultation with another nation's NAO. 6 Lodging a complaint
against another nation requires that a member nation establish
proof of "a persistent pattern of failure by [the] other party to
effectively enforce" its own labor laws.287 If the matter cannot be
277 See id. art. 11(2), 32 LL.M. at 1505-06.
278 Id. art. 11(3), 32 I.L.M. at 1506.
279 See id. art. 12.
280 See id. art. 12(5).
281 See id. art 14(1).
282 See id. art. 14(2), 32 I.L.M. at 1506-07.
283 See id. art. 15(2), 32 I.L.M. at 1507.
284 See id. art. 16(1).
285 See id. art. 16(2).
286 See id. art. 21().
287 See id. art. 27(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1509.
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resolved by the NAOs working together or through a ministerial
consultation, then the complainant-nation may request a hearing
by an Evaluation Committee of Experts, selected by the Council to
review the matter."' After considering the complaint, this panel
issues recommendations to the parties and the Council.289
Sanctions, in the form of withholding NAFTA benefits in the
amount of any monetary enforcement assessment previously
imposed, may only be ordered much farther down the road, after
an arbitral panel has failed to convince an errant nation to comply
with the obligation imposed on it through the dispute resolution
290process.
Thus, the NAALC establishes a long procedural road before
sanctions are imposed upon a nation.29' The dispute resolution
system builds in ample time and opportunity to comply with any
order against a party. Moreover, in reviewing the actions of
nations, panel investigations must establish a "sustained or
recurring pattern" 92 of failure to implement and enforce national
labor laws and further establish that the pattern does not represent
a discretionary matter on the part of the opposing nation.293 There
is no interlocutory relief provision in the NAALC; 94 thus, it is
reasonable to assume that while the lengthy process of bringing a
complaint drags on, the abuses can continue unchecked.
Continuing abuses could be difficult to establish, since a panel can
only be convened where the matter is found to be "trade related"'295
288 See id. art. 23(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1508.
289 See id. art. 26, 32 I.L.M. at 1509.
290 See id. art. 41(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1512. A monetary enforcement assessment is
only imposed after the failure of a party to comply with an agreed-upon plan. See id.
291 See supra notes 286-90 and accompanying text.
292 NAALC, supra note 171, art. 49, 32 I.L.M. at 1514.
293 See id. art. 49(1)(a).
294 See generally NAALC, supra note 171, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (revealing that the
NAALC has no interlocutory relief provision).
295 See id. art. 23(3)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 1508. A situation is trade related where it
involves "workplaces, firms, companies or sectors that produce goods or provide
services" that are either "traded between the territories of the Parties," or that
"compete ... with goods or services produced or provided by persons of another Party"
in the market of the nation whose practices are being questioned. Id. art. 49, 32 I.L.M.
at 1514.
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and covered by "mutually recognized labor laws." '296  This
requirement would not cover some concerns. For example, this
requirement would not apply to Mexico's informal sector, which
includes many small enterprises and is not covered by Mexican
labor law,297 unless it could be shown that workers in this informal
sector are directly competing with goods produced or services
provided by a Canadian or American entity.298
iv. Private Rights ofAction Under the NAALC
The NAALC gives no private right of action to individuals in
signatory nations seeking enforcement of laws in other signatory
nations.299 Thus, labor organizations in America could not petition
an American court to have labor laws in Mexico or Canada
enforced. Nor could a citizen of a signatory nation appeal to the
Council to have that nation enforce its own laws. Moreover, the
NAALC does not provide for the second guessing of a signatory
nation's official decisions300 as to labor matters.' So, once a
decision is at least pending before a party's official decision
making body, it cannot be questioned or evaluated, except,
presumably, where the decision represents part of a larger pattern
of failure to enforce labor laws.302 Even then, the decision would
not be individually scrutinized or overturned but simply put in
place as a part of the pattern.3 3
296 See id. art. 23(3)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 1508. The laws in question must "address the
same general subject matter in a manner that provides enforceable rights, protections or
standards." Id. art. 49, 32 I.L.M. at 1514.
297 See Hagen, supra note 258, at 921 n.10.
298 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 252, at 89. "If a NAFTA party possesses
inadequate internal labor laws or regulations, however, the NAALC has no authority to
alter such legislation." Id.
299 See NAALC, supra note 171, art. 43, 32 I.L.M. at 1513.
300 Decisions made by "administrative, quasi-judicial, judicial, or labor tribunals"
shall not be subject to revision or reheard under the provisions of NAALC. See id. art.
5(8), 32 I.L.M. at 1504; see also id. art. 49(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1514.
301 See id. art. 5(8), 32 I.L.M. at 1504.
302 See id. art. 27(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1509.
303 See id. art. 49, 32 I.L.M. at 1514. "[A] 'pattern of practice' means a course of
action or inaction beginning after the date of entry into force of the Agreement, and does
not include a single instance or case." Id. (emphasis added). Whereas, a 'persistent
pattern' means a sustained or recurring pattern of practice .... Id.
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v. The Role of Labor Organizations Under the
NAALC
Although the NAALC's purpose is to encourage member
nations to protect worker's rights, the role of labor groups is
somewhat marginalized in the operation of the agreement. The
only real role for representatives of labor or business is through
national advisory committees, which a nation may, but is not
required to, convene.3 4  These committees operate solely in an
advisory capacity, offering suggestions to the member nation on
the "implementation and further elaboration" of the NAALC. °5
Thus, other than in the national advisory committee, labor is given
no representative voice by the governing structure of the NAALC.
C. Chile, NAFTA, Fast Track, and the Future for NAALC
In 1995, the NAFTA trading partners began negotiations with
Chile to join NAFTA, °6 and the debate over the NAALC
resurfaced.3"7 Principally, this debate has revolved around the
renewal of fast track authority and the administration's ability to
link trade negotiations with social concerns, like labor.308 Fast
track authority, originally granted in the Trade Act of 1974309 and
extended over time through various acts of Congress,310 grants the
President authority to negotiate trade agreements, which are then
submitted to Congress for a yes or no vote, without amendments.31'
Chile has regarded fast track authority as essential to its ability to
negotiate sensitive matters with the United States.312 Moreover,
304 See id. art. 17, 32 I.L.M. at 1507.
305 See id.
306 See After Free Trade Euphoria, supra note 164, at 131.
307 See Crane, supra note 173, at 898.
308 See, e.g., Gephardt, supra note 54, at 857-58; Crane, supra note 173, at 898.
309 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2191 (1995).
310 See Taylor, supra note 252, at 22-32 (describing the evolution of fast track
authority).
311 See Taylor, supra note 252, at 22-32.
312 See Kantor Says Talks Will Continue on Ways and Means' Fast-Track Bill, 12
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.38, at 1593 (Sept. 27, 1995) [hereinafter Kantor]; see also
Key Staffer, supra note 167, at 705 ("Chile--which has been waiting to join NAFTA-
has repeatedly stated that it will not negotiate on substantive issues with the United
States without fast-track authority being renewed.").
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the South American nation does not object to being included in the
NAALC."' Nevertheless, some congressional members object to
the inclusion of Chile in the NAALC and seek to restrict fast track
authority in order to deny the President the ability to accomplish
this.3"4 Ultimately, in 1996, this debate caused a derailment of not
only the reauthorization of fast track, but also U.S. involvement in
negotiations to include Chile in NAFTA."'
Labor groups, however, have expressed concern over the
prospect of Chile joining NAFTA without signing the NAALC.316
While Chile is considered a model economy in Latin America due
to a decade of consistent economic expansion,317 it has a spotty
labor record.318 For example, at a U.S. Trade Representative public
hearing on the discretionary criteria (including workers' rights)
involved in extending GSP319 benefits, "several labor and human
rights organizations testified in favor of complete removal of GSP
313 See After Free Trade Euphoria, supra note 164, at 133.
314'See Kantor,'supra note 312, at 1593. The proposed Republican fast track bill
Would limit the authority to introduce bills "consisting only of provisions 'directly
related' to trade-negotiating objectives... [and only those provisions that are]
'necessary' to carry out the trade agreement." Id. The previous fast track authority was
less restrictive and only applied to bills "that contained provisions 'necessary or
appropriate' to implement the trade agreement." Id.
315 See Key Staffer, supra note 167, at 705. However, in May 1996, the staff
director of the House Ways and Means Trade.Subcommittee "predicted that a renewal of
fast-track negotiating authority would be passed by Congress in 1997 regardless of who
wins the November [1996] presidential election [in the United States]." Id.
316 See, e.g., Gephardt, supra note 54, at 858 (reporting that the director of the
AFL-CIO task force on trade cautioned two Congressional subcommittees that, if
granted, fast track "should be limited to Chile and must include worker rights and
standards and capital markets as principal negotiating objectives"). Moreover, in May
1996, Canadian labor organizations unsuccessfully urged the government of Canada to
use its ongoing bilateral talks with Chile as an opportunity to strengthen the NAALC.
See Labor Charges Canada Missing Chance to Improve Side Agreements in Chile Pact,
13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.20, at 804 (May 15, 1996) [hereinafter Labor Charges].
317 See After Free Trade Euphoria,, supra note 164, at 131 ("By seeking only
Chile's accession to the existing 'toothless' NAFTA side agreements, which do not set
uniform standards across the NAFTA countries, Canada is endorsing Chilean
labor... laws that fall far short of accepted international standards .... ).
318 In unofficial talks between the United States and Chile regarding labor laws,
Chile indicated a desire to reform its labor laws. See Talks with Chile on NAFTA Labor
Laws Continue Unofficially, Negotiator Says, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.8, at 275
(Feb. 21, 1996) [hereinafter Talks with Chile]. Suggested changes include "reforms to
make it easier for unions in Chile to enter into collective bargaining agreements with
employers" and reforms to facilitate the enforcement of labor laws. See id. at 275-76.
319 See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the GSP.
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beneficiary status from specific developing countries [including
Chile] on the grounds that these countries violated one or more of
the internationally recognized worker rights" as defined by the
statute.32° At this hearing, the AFL-CIO and America's Watch
made statements against Chile's GSP status based on that nation's
less than pristine labor record.321 In addition, as recently as the
mid-1980s, one of the Chilean labor leaders expressed the opinion
that fear of oppression, unemployment, and government violence
had all but killed the Chilean labor movement.322
In 1995, fast track authority for free trade agreements stalled in
Congress over the issue of Chile's accession to the NAALC.323
The pressure to pass fast track authority for free trade agreements
was heightened by the fact that Chile was negotiating for inclusion
in other hemispheric FTAs3 24 and was unwilling to wait until after
the U.S. presidential elections in 1996 for a congressional decision
on fast track.325 Hence, the debate over linking trade with labor
concerns has proven a stumbling block for increasing the breadth
and market power of NAFTA. In sum, there is concern that
admitting Chile to NAFTA without requiring inclusion in the
Supplemental agreements could circumvent many of the gains
achieved by the NAALC.
326
320 See Perez-Lopez, supra note 7, at 272.
321 See id. at 273 n.57.
322 See PATRICIA POLITZER, FEAR IN CHILE 174 (1989) (describing the travails of
Manuel Bustos Huerta). Chile inherits its current labor laws from the dictatorship of
General Augusto Pinochet, under whose regime "the enforcement of labor law was
dramatically curtailed and practically eliminated." See Talks with Chile, supra note 318,
at 276 (quotations omitted). The Pinochet regime ended in 1989. See id.
323 See Administration Still Wants Talks on Fast-Track Renewal, Kantor Says, 12
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.45, at 1890 (Nov. 15, 1995).
324 See After Free Trade Euphoria, supra note 164, at 133.
325 Chile joined the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) in March 1995. See
"Nation's Governors Concerned Chile Negotiations Hamper States' Trade, 13 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No.29, at 1161 (July 17, 1996). At the 1996 annual meeting of the National
Governors' Association, governors from across the nation expressed concern that "the
NAFTA delay'for Chile is allowing European and Asian competitors to take away
potential U.S. exports." Id. Moreover, Mississippi Governor Kirk Fordice (R)
suggested that the United States must act quickly to bring Chile into NAFTA. See id.
Fordice predicted that, absent speedy action to include Chile in NAFTA, officials from
the U.S. government would eventually be forced to travel to South America with 'hat in
hand' hoping to join MERCOSUR. See id.
326 See id.
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D. Problems with the NAALC
Some would argue that the NAALC is the prototype of a
modem agreement designed to encourage international labor
standards, because, while its list of labor principles may be
overbroad, it establishes basic labor goals, does not impose a
minimum acceptable level on member nations, allows member
nations the power to implement their own labor laws in lieu of
having standards forced upon them, and allows member nations to
develop as their cultural, social, and economic circumstances
permit.327 However, in reviewing the NAALC, the question
arises-what does the NAALC accomplish?
The NAALC is limited to a very narrow range of effects.
While the agreement encourages member nations to enforce their
own labor laws, it has no normative influence over those laws.
328
While it suggests certain labor principles of importance, it does not
prioritize among those principles. 329  And, while the agreement
provides for dispute resolution among the member nations, it
seems apparent that the burden of establishing a persistent pattern
may be difficult to overcome in many, if not most, instances.330
Thus limited in scope, at least one commentator has questioned
whether the NAALC represents the effective remedy to the labor
concerns raised by free trade that was promised.3
Perhaps the most troubling issue pertaining to the NAALC is
the lack of direct influence labor groups have over the functioning
327 See generally OECD, supra note 180 (suggesting that, rather than imposing
labor standards, agreements regarding international labor standards should establish
floors and allow signatory nations to develop their own standards as they develop
economically).
328 See NAALC, supra note 171, art. 3, 32 I.L.M. at 1503.
329 See id. art. 49, 32 I.L.M. at 1513.
330 See id. art. 27-41, 32 I.L.M. at 1509-13.
331 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 225, at 60-61 ("The separately negotiated [NAALC]
adopts a weak mechanism for rights enforcement .... ). But see Taylor, supra note
252, at 88 ("To the extent that such enforcement will decrease the incentive for U.S.
companies to seek out the work environment having the least regulated work
enforcement mechanism, the NAALC may somewhat lessen the threat of labor
dislocation."); Hagen, supra note 258, at 930-31. "[T]he most important features of the
labor agreement are not dependent on sanctions... [instead] the most important
features ... are the broad areas for cooperative activities and the potential benefit of the
'sunshine effect."' Id.
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of the agreement. As noted above, labor representatives are
limited in the influence they can assert upon the governing
structure of the NAALC.332 If the goal of organized labor is to give
voice and power to a previously silenced and disempowered
group,331 then paradoxically the NAALC subverts the goals of the
very group it seeks to protect. The agreement removes the power
of real action from the workers and places it in the hands of
government bureaucracies, which arguably have very limited
powers themselves.334
In addition, trade sanctions for failure to enforce labor laws
may be imposed only after an arduous and lengthy process of
consultations, meetings, panel decisions, failures to agree to action
plans, arbitrations, and failures to either pay fines or comply with
previously agreed upon action plans.335  During this time, any
abuses occurring are allowed to continue unchecked, without any
effect on free access to the markets of other parties.336
Furthermore, sanctions are difficult to impose because of the
burden of having to establish a persistent pattern of failure to
enforce.337 One commentator has suggested, therefore, that if the
NAALC is to succeed at all, "it is most likely to succeed if the
cooperative opportunities envisioned in the agreement are
emphasized." '338
Obviously, the NAALC (or any similar agreement signed by
members of a FTA) is not the entire solution. It is an important
332 See supra notes 304-05 and accompanying text for a discussion of labor's role
under the NAALC.
333 See generally Collingsworth, supra note 2, at 36-42 (discussing the goals and
achievements of the U.S. labor movement); CRAVER, supra note I (outlining the benefits
realized by workers as a result of unionization).
334 See supra notes 267-303 and accompanying text.
See Hagen, supra note 258, at 930 ("All of this envisions a very extended time
period before an assessment can ever be imposed-and considerable additional time
before any trade sanctions can be imposed.").
336 See generally NAALC, supra note 171, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (revealing an agreement
without interlocutory relief measures).
337 See Hagen, supra note 258, at 930.
338 Id. at 936. Hagen argues that the benefits derived from cooperative programs
sharing labor data and management techniques may create a "sunshine effect." See id. at
931. In other words, by facilitating free exchange of information and exposure to
innovative solutions, all member nations may experience improved labor conditions.
See id.
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first step in a very long journey toward protecting international
labor standards in the context of a global economy. The problems
caused by American MNCs exporting production to developing
economies for the purpose of circumventing American labor laws
may be somewhat ameliorated by the NAALC; there are, however,
many more developing economies outside the range of the
supplemental agreement which continue to lure foreign investment
by the promise of little labor legislation and, thus, low production
costs.
339
The GATT, under which nations were encouraged to form
regional trading agreements like NAFTA, does not address the
issue of whether regional trade agreements should "coordinate
trade policy with domestic legislation on 'non-trade' issues such as
labor .... Whether or not the WTO, which now encompasses
the GATT, will include labor concerns as part of its agenda
remains to be seen.3 4' There is, however, some indication that
world leaders are beginning to recognize the importance of
including the issue as part of discussions on establishing the
powers of the WTO.342 In fact, the European Trade Commissioner
has urged that the WTO "cannot continue to be silent on labor
standards if it wants to work effectively on other issues. 343 At
present, there is no clear indication as to what, if any, provisions
regarding labor issues are likely to be included' on the WTO
agenda.
339 For example, consider other developing nations like Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and South Korea. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text for a
description of techniques used by governments of developing nations to attract MNCs.
See Taylor, supra note 252, at 69.
341 See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 70, at 263 ("Although no agreement was
reached that the topic [of labor standards] should be on the agenda of the WTO-
through the establishment of a committee or working party-calls for linking the
benefits of WTO membership, or even membership itself, to the adoption and
enforcement of minimum labour standards can be expected to continue to be heard.").
342 See infra note 343 and accompanying text.
343 See EU Trade, supra note 174, at 1751 (describing the European Trade
Commissioner's plans to continue to liberalize trade in the post-Uruguay Round era).
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V. Conclusion
The issue facing labor groups is no longer one of stopping the
liberalization of international free trade; global economy has
progressed too far to turn back from free trade.344 Moreover, "few
criticize the purposes of free trade."'3 45 Rather, the criticism arises
out of the "headlong rush" to free trade without including
consideration of "wholly relevant social concerns of the effected
populace. 3 46  Thus, it is clear that solutions to the difficulties
imposed by free trade upon the interests of labor forces in the
United States and around the world must be sought.
Throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries,
U.S. labor groups have struggled for recognition of certain basic
rights.347 One by one, these rights have been recognized. Now,
reticence on the part of the U.S. government (particularly
Congress) to commit to the consistent promotion of its own labor
policy in conjunction with foreign trade policy is threatening the
goals labor has achieved.3 48 Moreover, developing nations in the
throes of industrialization are facing the labor struggles Western
nations faced a century ago.349 It seems logical to extend the
benefit of any wisdom gained from a century of Western
industrialization to those developing nations now thrust into the
globalized world economy.
The NAALC represents the first FTA in which the United
States has combined trade with labor issues.35 As such, it is a
disappointment to those who would impose stricter requirements
on nations participating in free trade. The NAALC is limited,
because it only requires each nation to enforce its own labor laws,
serves to limit the voice of labor in the governing structure, and
seems to provide no forum for individuals who have been harmed
344 See CRAVER, supra note 1, at 119.
345 See Housman, supra note 7, at 814.
346 See id.
347 See CRAVER, supra note 1, at 10-33 (outlining the history of the American labor
movement).
348 See generally Collingsworth, supra note 2 (describing the cornerstone of
American labor policy as an evolution away from exploitation and toward equality).
349 See generally Collingsworth, supra note 2 (outlining American labor struggle).
350 See Taylor, supra note 252, at 65.
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by lack of labor law enforcement . 5
The failures of the NAALC, however, should not be
overstated; "[l]abor relation systems are still mainly national, and
will, for a long time to come, be so." '352 .Hence, the imposition of
international labor standards still raises strong issues of national
sovereignty. The means are not yet in place to allow for complete
transnational labor regulation.353 Linking trade with labor in
instruments such as the NAALC, however, is an important first
step to the transnational realization of basic labor and human
rights. Where the WTO fails to include labor standards as part of
its own agenda, the onus falls on the shoulders of individual
governments, such as those of the United States, Canada, Mexico,
and Chile, to negotiate these standards as part of trade agreements
for the benefit of their own labor forces and the labor forces of
351 See NAALC, supra note 171, 32 I.L.M. 1499.
352 Blanpain, supra note 64, at 909.
353 There are other possible solutions to the problems raised in this Comment, and it
should be emphasized that none of these solutions is mutually exclusive. See generally
CRAVER, supra note 1 (arguing for transnational labor organizing to bargain on the same
level that MNCs operate); Blanpain, supra note 64 (offering arguments both for and
against transnational unionization as a solution to labor difficulties posed by MNCs);
Collingsworth, supra note 2 (arguing for domestic legislation to regulate the behavior of
MNCs that export production and then import back into the United States); Katherine
Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational
Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987 (1995) (outlining four models for
transnational labor regulation). See also White House Initiates Consultations on
Voluntary Code for Firms Abroad, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 569 (Mar. 29,
1995) (describing a March 1995 announcement by the Clinton administration that it was
working on a draft code of conduct to protect labor and human rights for employees of
foreign operations of American MNCs). If implemented, this code could provide both
important governmental guidance on this matter as well as a statement of firm policy
commitment to protect labor concerns. See id. However, the "Model Business
Principles," as the code is known, requires voluntary compliance and is not intended to
be adopted as legislation. See id.; see also U.S. Firms Have 'Overreacted' to Labor,
Environment Issues, U.S. Official Says, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.27, at 1148 (July
5, 1995) (describing how---subsequent to the announcement of the Model Business
Principles and the flurry of negative response from businesses and Republicans in
Congress--an official at the USTR office commented, "I wouldn't attach a lot of might
to this piece of paper as a legal matter"). Moreover, not all commentators support the
idea that corporations should take on human rights responsibilities. See Cassel, supra
note 78, at 1976 ("[W]hen executives commit corporate funds for social responsibility,
they wrongfully usurp the funds of their shareholders, or possibly of their customers, or
even of their employees." (quoting Nobel Prize winning economist Milton Friedman)).
While many MNCs may establish self-policing policies for their operations abroad, see
Blumenthal, supra note 11, at A22, the matter of international labor standards is too
important for the government to rely on the discretion of profit-seeking MNCs.
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their global trading partners. Recognizing the danger of cultural
imperialism implicit in such negotiations, industrialized nations
must come to the bargaining table with a consciousness borne of
experience in order to fairly assess how much and how quickly
international labor standards can be achieved.
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